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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE BASES OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITIES*
Two modifications of the doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland,1 introduced
by the Supreme Court in the present term, necessitate a reappraisal of the
entire system of intergovernmental tax immunities. The cases arise from
the conflict of two basic principles. On the one hand, the activities of one
sovereign should not be hamstrung by the tax laws of the other. On the
other hand, to satisfy augmented fiscal needs the sovereign power to tax
must also be protected from unnecessary interference.2 In order that these
objectives may be harmonized, the Court has reconsidered established for-
mulae for determining the validity of the taxes of either sovereign which
impinge on the "instrumentalities" of the other. One recently established
test casts considerable doubt upon the continued validity of constitutional
exemptions when invoked for the benefit of private interests., Another
decision,4 recognizing the broad authority of Congress to confer express
exemptions on federal instrumentalities, presages not only a possible narrow-
ing of state tax powers, but also the transformation of intergovernmental tax
immunity from constitutional into legislative terms.
In Alabama v. King & Boozer,5 the Supreme Court considered a vendee
sales tax levied upon the purchases of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee defense con-
tractor.6 There was no express legislative provision for immunity, and the
Court refused to impute to Congress an intention to forbid the tax. Finding
that the contractor was an entity independent of the Government, the Court
upheld the tax because it had no "legal incidence" upon an instrumentality
of the United States.7 Written with the knowledge that the Government
* Alabama v. King & Boozer, 62 Sup. Ct. 43 (U. S. 1941) ; Federal Land Bank of
St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 1 (U. S. 1941).
1. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
2. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 523-24 (1926) ; James v. Dravo Con-
tracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 150 (1937).
3. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 62 Sup. Ct. 43 (U. S. 1941).
4. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 1 (U. S.
1941).
5. 62 Sup. Ct. 43 (U. S. 1941).
6. The Alabama sales tax is a privilege or license tax collected from the vendor,
who must collect it in turn from the vendee. ALA. CODE (1940) c. 51, §§ 753, 776.
Hence the tax is a "vendee tax." McPhillips Mfg. Co. v. Curry, 2 So. (2d) 600, 605
(Ala. 1941). Although the fact that the contractor was working on a Government order
would not relieve him from a state tax, Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291
U. S. 466 (1934), the Government argued that a "cost-plus" contractor was controlled
by the United States, and that the tax, falling upon the United States through this
agent, was invalid. See Brief for the United States as amicus curiae, p. 97, Alabama v.
King & Boozer, 62 Sup. Ct. 43 (U. S. 1941).
7. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 62 Sup. Ct. 43, 47 (U. S. 1941).
NOTES
must reimburse the contractor s the opinion emphasizes the present unim-
portance of the once influential "economic burden" test.0 Thus, instead of
weighing the relative immediacy of a tax impact upon a sovereign, the courts
will henceforth regard the formal identity of the taxpayer, and invalidate
the levy only when the legal entity taxed is a public instrumentality.1 0 In the
light of history and precedent in the field, it is probable that the "legal
incidence" test set out in the King & Boozer case will find application not
only to situations involving state taxation of federal functions, but also to
federal taxes on local instrumentalities."1 Moreover, the generality of the
test permits no distinction between tax objects'which are constitutionally
immune, and those which are exempt by legislative fiat. Of course, the
general rule forbidding discriminatory taxation of public instrumentalities
remains: a tax specifically seeking out a public function, although having
its legal incidence upon a private person, would no doubt be invalid.12
Likewise, the "essential function" test, devised solely to permit federal
taxation of proprietary or non-governmental functions of the states, has not
been superseded.' 3 But apart from these more narrow doctrines, the King
& Boozer case establishes the first general yardstick in the immunities field.
In precise application, the King & Boozer legal incidence test may be
undesirably formalistic. For example, the rule appears to validate all non-
discriminatory taxes paid by private persons, in spite of their effect upon
public instrumentalities. Contrariwise, taxes laying an ultimate economic
burden upon private interests, but collected from and thus having their
"incidence" on a public body, seem to be invalid under the King & Boozer
rule. Hence a sale by an expressly immune federal corporation to a private
person will not be subject to a vendor sales tax, nor to a franchise tax
measured by the sales price. It will, however, be subject to a vendee sales tax.
Conversely, a purchase by the corporation from a private person will be subject
8. The Government estimated that a denial of immunity in this case would subject
the United States to a tax liability of $33,946,177 for 1941 purchases, and $54,000,0]0
for purchases made in 1942, in fulfilling 548 "cost-plus" contracts having a gross value
of $6,720,929,777. Brief for the United States as ainicus curide, Appendix B, pp. 19-21,
Alabama v. King & Boozer, 62 Sup. Ct. 43 (U. S. 1941). See Art. II (1)m, C. P. F. F.
Form No. 1, Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Construction Contract, 1 Prentice-Hall 1941
Nat. Defense Serv. f 4503.
9. Apparently, neither the practical effect of enforcement [Graves v. Texas Co.,
298 U. S. 393, 401 (1936)] nor the remoteness of the burden [Helvering v. Gerhardt,
304 U. S. 405, 421 (1938); Graves v. New York, 306 U. S. 466, 481 (1939)] will b2
considered.
10. The doctrine was forecast in Flint v. Stone Tracy & Co., 220 U. S. 107, 165
(1911), and was adverted to in Liggett & Myers Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 333,
386 (1937); see 1 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTrTuTIuO.NAL LAnW (2d ed. 1929) § 82.
11. Compare Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938), and Graves v. O'Keefe,
306 U. S. 466 (1939).
12. See Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824); Miller v. fil-
waulee, 272 U. S. 713 (1927); cf. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 303 U. S. 134, lj-
61 (1927) ; Tradesmens Nat. Bank v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 309 U. S. E0, 567 (1940).
13. See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905); California v.
United States, 297 U. S. 175, 184 (1936).
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to a vendor sales tax or to a franchise tax,"' but immune from the vendee sales
tax. Similarly paradoxical results may be expected where the transactions in-
volve a federal tax and an "essential" state or local instrumentality. But, while
the legal incidence test does not eliminate the fine distinctions commonly asso-
ciated with the immunity doctrine, there can be little doubt that a practical
application of the test will further restrict the field of exemptions historically
implied from the Constitution. Thus the rule seems to uphold any non-dis-
criminatory tax having its legal incidence upon public employees, contractors,
lessees, or their property, incomes, or operations not specifically exempted by
Congress.15
In sharp contrast to its restriction of immunity in the King & Boover
case, the Supreme Court in Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck
Lumber Company'6 reaffirmed the comprehensiveness of the tax exemption
specifically conferred by Congress upon Federal Land Banks. 17 The case
involved a sales tax' 8 upon Land Bank purchases of lumber to be used
in the repair of foreclosed premises. The state argued that the operations
taxed were proprietary and non-essential, and that, whatever the meaning
of the exemption provision, Congress was without power to immunize them
against state taxation.' 9 But the Court, refusing to investigate the wisdom
of the immunity, ruled that the grant of immunity was in aid of the consti-
tutional exercise of delegated powers, and therefore valid under the "neces-
sary and proper" clause of the Constitution.20 In reaching its decision, the
Court implicitly assumed an identity between governmental function and
14. Thus the Illinois Retailers' State Occupation Tax, IU. Ray. STAT. (1941) c.
120, § 440, is not a vendee sales tax, and hence the price paid to Illinois vendors by fed-
eral instrumentalities will include the tax item. See 17 Ors. ComI,. GEN. 863 (1938),
aff'd, 20 Oes. CoMp. GEN. 752 (1941).
15. In recent years, the Court has rapidly eliminated such exemptions, upholding
income taxes touching federal employees [Graves v. New York, 306 V. S. 466 (1939)],
state employees [Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938)], lessees of state lands
[Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (1938)], federal contractors
[Atkinson v. Tax Commissioner, 303 U. S. 20 (1938) (net income); James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 602 U. S. 134 (1937) (gross income)], trustees of local street railway
[Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934)], and excise taxes levied against purchases
by a Government contractor [Trinityfarm Constr. Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466 (1934)1,
storage of oil by a federal land lessee [Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board,
288 U. S. 325 (1933)], licensing of copyrights [Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123
(1932)], franchise of corporation obtaining part of its income from Government bonds
[Pacific Co. Ltd. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480 (1932)]. Chances of obtaining immunity
are diminished in cases of the private interests by the rule placing upon them the bur-
den of establishing an unconstitutional interference with Government powers. This
interference has frequently been disclaimed by the Government in recent cases. See
argument for the United States, Graves v. New York, 306 U. S. 466, 473 (1939).
16. 62 Sup. Ct. 1 (U. S. 1941).
17. 39 STAT. 380 (1916), 12 U. S. C. § 931 (Supp. 1939).
18. Laws of North Dakota (1937) c. 249.
19. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 1, 4
(U. S. 1941).
20. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
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constitutional power. A finding that the act creating the Land Bank is
constitutional thus includes a finding that the tax exemptions it creates
are proper. A more familiar statement of this rationale is that the power
to create implies a power to preserve.
2 1
On the basis of the Bismarck case, Congress apparently has complete
license to confer immunities wherever the activity immunized involves an
exercise of constitutional powers. Apparently, also, this legislative immunity
may be established on the basis of an implied intention of Congress. Literally,
if the "cost-1lus" contractor in the King & Boozer case had been legis-
latively designated an agent of the United States, the tax would have had
its legal incidence upon the Government through its instrumentality, and
would thus have been invalid.2 And given an express grant of immunity,
the legal incidence test might become an instrument for expanding and
enforcing legislative exemptions, since the remoteness of the burden would
no longer operate to uphold a tax the legal incidence of which is upon the
exempted instrumentality.
In the light of the broadening of immunities created by the legislature,
the narrowed scope of exemptions to be implied from the Constitution takes
on added significance. While it was long believed, and forcefully expounded,
that the legislative immunity was coextensive with that which would be
constitutionally implied,2 the King & Boozer and Bismarck cases continue
a frend toward establishing Congress as the final authority for immunizing
federal instrumentalities.24 Although the Court was "not . . . concerned
with the extent and the appropriate exercise of the power of Congress
to free such transactions from state taxation" 2 in the King & Boozer case,
the decision clearly indicates that a future grant of exemption by Congress
to "cost-plus" contractors would be allowed to supersede the judicial denial
of constitutional immunity. 0 In the Bismarck case, moreover, the deference
of the Court to Congress was overt.2 7 Thus the decisions seem to establish
21. See Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 33 (1939).
22. Congress refused an amendment designed to make "cost-plus" contractors
agents of the Government for tax purposes. See Proposed Scnate Amendment No. 120
to H. R. 8438, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); 86 Coxa. REc. 7528-35, 7648 (1940). A
bill which would specifically confer exemptions upon "cost-plus" contractors is now
pending. H. R. 6049, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); see 87 Com:. REc., Nov. 18, 1941,
at 9228.
23. See Pond, Intergovernncntal Immnity: A Compara've Study of Ile Federal
System (1941) 26 IOWA L. REv. 272" 300. But cf. Graves v. New York, 306 U. S. 466,
478-79 (1939).
24. Thus immunity has been granted only because Congress prescribed it. Pittman
v. HOLC, 308 U. S. 21, 33 (1939) ; Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U. S. 245, 249 (1937). And
it has been denied because Congress provided no exemption. James v. Dravo Contract-
ing Co., 302 U. S. 134, 161 (1937) ; Federal Compress Co. v. McLean, 291 U. S. 17, 23
(1934) ; Shaw v. Oil Corp., 276 U. S. 575, 578-79 (1928).
25. 62 Sup. Ct. 43, 45 (U. S. 1941).
26. See note 22 supra.
27. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 1, 6 (U.
S. 1941).
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a doctrine analogous to that of the preempted "federal field" in bankruptcy.2 8
Where Congress has spoken, its mandate will be held conclusive insofar
as state taxation of the federal instrumentality is concerned. In McCulloch
v. Maryland and the decisions descending therefrom, the objectionable state
statutes were held void and unconstitutional under an implied limitation
on the tax power.2 9 Under the modern doctrine of legislative immunity,
however, the offending statute is held inconsistent with federal legislation,
and therefore inoperative.30 The difference is that between constitutional
and statutory interpretation. But where Congress has refrained from exercise
,of legislative power and no intention that the instrumentality be immune
may be inferred, the courts will still invoke the doctrine of implied con-
stitutional immunity, and adjudicate according to the legal incidence con-
cept.3 ' Immunity of federal instrumentalities from state taxation is thereby
reinforced, while immunity of state instrumentalities from federal tax laws
rests upon a circumscribed constitutional basis.
It is thus with reference to the protection of state powers that the problem
of constitutional immunity grows acute. State powers are threatened from
two directions: first, the spread of federal activities into new fields limits
state tax powers wherever the federal supremacy is used to establish legis-
lative immunities; secondly, the narrowed scope of constitutional immunities
subjects an increasing number of state instrumentalities to federal tax
burdens, in some measure limiting the exercise of sovereign powers. The
restriction of constitutional immunities may, however, be defended on the
ground that essential state functions can not be directly taxed under the
legal incidence test. And the federal supremacy doctrine is often justified
by the somewhat jejune argument that state interests are represented in
Congress, whereas state levies on federal bodies would involve taxation
without representation.3 2 To be meaningful, this approach probably pre-
supposes that Congress can and will maintain a balance between grants
and waivers of exemption with respect to federal instrumentalities, a scarcely
realistic assumption. But the argument suggests important problems: if
state powers are to be protected through federal waivers of immunity, with
respect to what tax objects may the waiver device be employed? Is the
power to waive immunity coextensive with the power to confer it? Because
of their practical importance, public bonds, for example, comprise a field
in which these concepts must soon be investigated.
28. See Williston, The Effect of a National Bankruptcy Law upon State Lawrs (1909)
22 HARv. L. REv. 547; Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1090.
29. 4 Wheat. 316, 430 (U. S. 1819).
30. See Graves v. New York, 306 U. S. 466, 478-79 (1939); Federal Land Bank v.
Crosland, 261 U. S. 374, 377 (1923).
31. See Alabama v. King & Boozer, 62 Sup. Ct. 43, 45 (U. S. 1941). Since the
state tax is not automatically valid where the Government has not preempted the field,
the analogy to bankruptcy, aliens and interstate commerce "supremacy" is not perfect.
See Donelson, Federal Supremacy and the Davidowitz Case (1941) 29 GEo. L. J. 755.
32. See Hottenstein, Survey of Exemption of State instruientalities From Federal
Taxation, Rep. No. 20, IlxsTruTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICRS (1937); Gardner, Tax
Immune Bonds (1939) 8"GEo. WAsn. L. REv. 1200, 1212.
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In the present state of the law, interest on both local and federal bonds
is constitutionally immune from intergovernmental income ta.xation. s Ex-
pounded by the decisions of another era, however, the reasoning upon which
this immunity depended has been specifically overruled. The power to levy
a non-discriminatory tax is no longer held to imply a power to destroy ;
taxation of income is not now regarded as taxation of its source 3 and
the ultimate effect of a tax in the direction of increasing costs of govern-
ment is disregarded in favor of a test looking no further than its legal
incidence.30 Despite these inroads into the immunity doctrine, however,
it remains true that analogies may be deceptive in the specialized field of
public finance 7 Owing to the sensitive nature of the securities market, a
tax upon bond interest operates directly to increase the cost of borrowing
before the power to borrow is exercised.38 Furthermore, as admitted by
Justice Brandeis, the bondholder has given valuable consideration for im-
munity in the shape of minimized discounts, or acceptance of reduced interest
rates.3 9 Thus the immunity does not redound to the exclusive benefit of
the individual, but reflects an equivalent public advantage. Outright judicial
repudiation of the immunity, therefore, might be regarded by the Court
both as a breach of faith with investors, and as an actual interference with
borrowing powers.40
33. Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895); Weston v.
Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1829). See also I,,r. Rzv. CoDE- §22(b)4 (1933) ; 16 S, T.
272 (1870), 31 U. S. C. § 742 (Supp. 1939). But cf. Ptu. L. No. 7, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Feb. 19, 1941) §§ 3, 4. Bonds of the United States issued after March 1, 1941,
are subject to federal income taxation, but remain ezempt from state and local ta.:ation.
34. See dissent of Justice Holmes, Panhandle Oil Co. Y. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223
(1928) ; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 158 (1937).
35. New York ex Me. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 303, 314 (1937) ; Graves v. Neew
York, 306 U. S. 466, 480 (1939) ; cf. Hale v. State Board, 302 U. S. 95 (1937).
36. It has been said that the Government, bidding competitively in %arious markets,
seeks not advantages over but equality with private enterprises. See Helvering v. Ger-
hardt, 304 U. S. 405, 421-22 (1938).
37. While the issues giving rise to the legal incidence concept involved instruments
other than public bonds, the comprehensive immunity originally attaching to public
bond interest has been consistently narrowed. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S.
107 (1911) (franchise tax touching gross income of bondholder); Willcuts v. Bunn,
2S2 U. S. 216 (1931) (profit on sale of bonds) ; Denman v. Slayton, 282 U. S. 514 (1931)
(deduction for interest on borrowed money invested in bonds); Greener v. Lewellyn,
258 U. S. 384 (1922) (inheritance tax touching bonds). See generally, Fellman, Intcr-
governmental Relations in the United States (1940) 207 A.'i. Ac:%D. PoL. SCL 27.
38. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 150 (1937), (1939) 37 Mic-.
L. REv. 1079, 1084.
39. See dissent, National Life Insurance Company v. United States, 277 U. S. 503,
528 (1928); Farmers Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 528 (1914).
40. See Farmers Bank v. 'Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516 (1914) ; Educational Films Corp.
v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 389 (1931). In Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 525
(1926), Justice Stone invoked a rule in some measure resembling the legal incidence
test, but indicated that a tax directly interfering with the functions of government, or a
tax that was discriminatory, would be invalid.
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The confusion prevailing in this area of the immunities field is illustrated
by consideration of a second method of instituting intergovernmental taxa-
tion of public bond interest. This plan assumes that the Sixteenth Amend-
ment permits federal taxation of state bond interest, and that the immunity
attaching to the interest on federal bonds may be waived by Congress.
41
There is ample authority to the effect that the Sixteenth Amendment was
intended to have the effect of its express terms and empower Congress to
levy on income "from whatever source derived." 42 Federal taxation of state
bonds might be accomplished, therefore, by judicial reconsideration of the
Amendment. But the basis upon which Congress may waive the immunity
accruing to the benefit of holders of outstanding issues of Government bonds
is not immediately apparent. The general power of Congress to waive
exemptions has frequently been asserted,43 but a survey of the cases reveals
that the issue of the validity of the power has never been specifically liti-
gated.4 4 In the majority of cases involving waivers, the Government has
assumed the burden of the tax, thus justifying the waivers as gifts to local
41. In U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIcE, THE IMMUNITY RULE AND THE SIXTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1938), the immunity is held to be outmoded; see also Foley, Reciprocal
Taxation of the Income from Pederal, State and Municipal Bonds (1941) 6 LEGAL
NoTEs ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 178. But see STATE ATTORNEvs GENERAL, CONSTITUTION-
AL IMMUNITY OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL SECURITIES (1939) ; Epstein, Self-Government
v. Federal Taxation of Your Local Securities (1941) 6 LEGAL NOTEs ON LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT 187.
42. "Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes upon incomes, from
whatever source derived . . ." U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XVI. For a collection of authorities
see DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE IMMUNITY RULE AND THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1938) Appendix, Vols. 1-6. The plan would necessitate the overruling of Pollock v.
Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601 (1895). Such reconsideration has been
most recently advocated in a concurring opinion by Justice Black. Helvering v. Ger-
hardt, 304 U. S. 405, 427 (1938).
43. See dissent, James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 181 (1937). In
VanAllen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 585 (U. S. 1865), it was argued that Congress
could not confer upon the states the right to tax. The Court avoided the issue saying,
"But as it respects a subject matter over which Congress and the states may exercise
a concurrent power, but from the exercise of which Congress, by reason of its para-
mount authority, may exclude the states, there is no doubt Congress may withhold the
exercise of that authority and leave the states free to act." Thus the Court regarded
national bank stock as taxable, in the absence of a specific exemption provision. Jus-
tice Marshall had emphasized that state taxation of the operations of the bank was
invalid, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (U. S. 1819), but that taxation of
its real property or the interests which the citizens of Maryland might hold in the insti-
tution was valid. But see Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664, 668
(1899).
44. At an early date, the immunity of federal currency from state taxation was
waived by Congress. 28 STAT. 278 (1894). Congress has also permitted non-discrilna-
tory taxation of national bank stock. REV. STAT. § 5219 (1875), 12 U. S. C. § 548 (Supp.
1939). More recently the device has been utilized with respect to federally owned cor-
porations. See Gardner, Tax Immune Bonds (1939) 8 GEO. WAsn. L. REV. 1200, 1212,
citing 32 instances. See Comment (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 326.
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tax units.45 On a jurisdictional level, an individual would probably have
"insufficient interest" to raise constitutional objections to this exercise of
the waiver power.46 And, it is probable that waivers subjecting private
interests to increased tax burdens would be upheld as conditions on the
grant of special rights or privileges. 47 But the general doctrine remains that
just as neither sovereign may deprive the other of a constitutional tax power,
so neither may confer upon the other an additional power to tax.1s There-
fore, it would seem, if the state has no original constitutional power to tax
a federal instrumentality, a legislative grant of the power to tax can not
be constitutionally given nor received.49 This conclusion is strengthened
by the doctrine that a state may not waive rights, privileges, or immunities
running to private persons.50 The power of the Federal Government would
appear to be similarly limited. If, therefore, interest on federal obligations
remains the subject of a co;stitutional immunity, it does not appear within
the power of Congress to waive the tax exempt feature of outstanding
obligations.
In the light of the foregoing analysis, little relation between legislative
powers to confer and to waive immunity may be perceived. While grants
of immunity are. justified as aiding the execution of constitutional Acts,
waivers can only be justified as gifts to local tax units, enforceable as
conditions on special grants. The power to establish immunity is thus
unlimited so long as the immunized instrumentality bears a relation to the
Act which it is designed to execute; the power to waive is probably limited
to those immunities which do not constitutionally accrue to the benefit of
private interests. Yet the two powers must be correlative if a cohesive plan
of federal supremacy is to be developed. With respect to instrumentalities
to be created in the future, Congress - through its powers to grant or with-
hold the right to tax - should have virtually unlimited discretion to deter-
mine what local taxation will burden the exercise of federal powers, and
what federal enterprises should bear their proportionate shares under local
45. See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, 473 (1938); United States v.
Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 66 (1936); Rodell, A Primer on Interstate Taxation (1935) 44
YA .E L. J. 1166, 1183.
46. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 487 (1923); Alabama Power Co. V.
Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, 478 (1938).
47. See Tradesmens Nat. Bank v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 309 U. S. 569, 551
(1940); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 151 (1911).
48. See Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 585 (U. S. 1865); Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 W, rheat. 1, 199 (U. S. 1824); Schweppe, State Taxation of National Ballb Stocths:
Uncertainty of Its Constitutional Basis (1922) 6 Mxim-. L. REv. 219, 224.
49. Congress may have power to make a gift of the right to ta.%--on the order of
the right held by a third party beneficiary of a contract-but in such case the duty to
pay the tax is owed by the taxpayer to the state government as a contract condition.
See REsTATrEmNT, CoRAc-crs (1932) § 135; 2 WmLISrox, Co-,xncrA (rev. ed. 1935)
§ 368. Unless the Federal Government can command this duty upon some special ground,
the individual subjected to a tax liability as a result of the waiver will have both the
standing and the ground for objection on the constitutional issue. See United States
v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 57 (1936).
50. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 295 (1936).
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tax levies.51 On this basis, Congress could, on the one hand, make future
issues of federal bonds subject to state levies. Purchasers of these bonds
should be estopped to complain of the local taxes. Or, on the other hand,
Congress could confer on federal agencies, old or new, specific exemption
like that considered in the Bismarck case. A less practical possibility might
be a provision making interest on the future issues subject to taxation by
those states which provided for federal taxation of the interest on future
issues of state and local bonds.5 2 In any case, the Court has indicated,
Congress is to judge the advisability of establishing the immunity or tax
liability of federal instrumentalities as they are created.
For the future, then, the immunity doctrine with respect to federal instru-
mentalities assumes a clearer outline of federal supremacy. The trend is
toward stringent limitation of the constitutional immunity doctrine with
regard to the states, and possible elimination with regard to federal instru-
mentalities. The King & Boozer and the Bismarck cases each mark a step
in the trend toward this ultimate result: in the one case, the scope of con-
stitutional immunity is narrowed toward the minimum necessary for the
maintenance of sovereignty ;53 in the other, the limits of legislative immunity
are broadened to admit the free exercise of legislative intent. After clari-
fication of the bond interest issue, the outlines of the federal supremacy
concept will assume a definite pattern. In the meantime, however, the con-
fusion of constitutional and legislative immunities renders uncertain not only
the value of public obligations, but the revenue systems of both the states
and the Federal Government.
5 4
51. See dissent of Justice Roberts, Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 377 (1937).
The power to grant immunity is not completely without limit, however. See National
Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353, 362 (U. S. 1869); cf. (1940) 38 Micn. L. Rv.
738, 741.
52. It has been indicated that state consent may in some cases remove the prohibi-
tion on the federal power to tax. United States v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27, 52 (1938).
53. See Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 59 (1933), where the
Court said: "The principle . . . of the immunity of state instrumentalities from federal
taxation, has its inherent limitations. . . . It is a principle implied from the necessity of
maintaining our dual system of government. . . . Springing from that necessity it does
not extend beyond it. Protecting the functions of government in its proper province, the
implication ceases when the boundary of that province is reached."
54. On June 30, 1940, there were $70,200,000 in tax exempt bonds outstanding. Rr,.
SEc'y TREAS. (1940) 812. The interest on part of these obligations is reached by the
states through privilege and franchise taxes. See Hervey, Judicial Delimitation of the
Exemption of Federal Instrumentalities from State Taxation (1938) 12 TE'. L. Q.
291, 327. It has been suggested that the Federal Government seek out and levy with
respect to taxable privileges in the same manner. See Hearings Before the Subcom-
inittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 5 and 154, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937) 21. The additional tax collectible by the Federal Government, were all
tax exempt securities made taxable, would, on the basis of 1937 tax rates, amount to
approximately $275,000,000 annually. Owing to the progressive nature of the surtax
rates, it is asserted, this increase in revenue would not be counteracted by a higher inter-
est rate made necessary by the abolition of the tax-exempt feature. See Foley, Reciprocal
Taxation of the Income From Federal, State and Municipal Bonds (1941) 6 LEGAL
NOTES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 178.
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REISSUE OF PATENTS ON BROADENED CLAIMS*
THE right to reissuance of a patent for the remainder of its original term
is granted by statute1 to a patentee whose patent is "wholly or partly in-
operative or invalid by reason of the patentee claiming as his own invention
more than he had a right to claim as new, if the error has arisen by in-
advertence, accident, or mistake and without any fraudulent or deceptive
intention." On surrender of the original, the patentee may secure a reissue
patent for the same invention, correcting the deficiency but adding no new
matter to the specification. 2 Designed apparently to enable patentees to
correct mistakes in their original specifications which threaten the life or
usefulness of their patents,3 the statute has frequently been used to secure
claims rejected by the Patent Office on the original applications 4 and to gain
unjustifiably broadened claims in order to embarrass competitors.0
Perhaps it was the widespread abuse of this grant that motivated the
United States Supreme Court, which ordinarily decides patent cases only
when circuit courts of appeals conflict,0 to grant certiorari in the recent
Carbide & Carbon case arising in the Fourth Circuit.j In this case, an in-
fringement action, plaintiff's original patent covered a process for manufac-
turing an automobile radiator anti-freeze by a chemical reaction into which
water was voluntarily introduced. Eighteen months later successful applica-
tion was made for a reissue patent making optional the voluntary introduction
of water. During this time interval defendants had experimented with a
reaction into which water was not voluntarily introduced, and which there-
fore would infringe only the later, reissue patent.8 Despite defendant's plea
of laches and its assertion of a personal, intervening estoppel right against
enforcement of the reissue patent, the Federal District Court granted the
plaintiff's suit for injunction.9 Relying largely upon experiments performed
at its order by a neutral expert and upon a presumption of validity attached
to the Patent Commissioner's action in granting the reissue, the court found
*United States Industrial Chemicals v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 121 F.
(2d) 665 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941), cert. granted, 62 Sup. Ct. 187 (U. S. 1941).
1. 45 STAT. 732 (1928), 35 U. S. C. §64 (1934).
2. Ibid.
3. See fahn v. Harwood, 112 U. S. 354 (18S4); Burr v. Duryce, 6S U. S. 531
(1863).
4. See Supreme M'fg. Corp. v. Security M.Nfg. Co., 299 Fed. 65, 66 (C. C.A. 9th,
1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 614 (1924); Dobson v. Lees, 137 U. S. 258 (1890).
5. See Yale Lock Co. v. Berkshire Bank, 135 U. S. 342 (1S9) ; Freeman v. Asmus,
145 U. S. 226 (1892).
6. See Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 62 Sup. Ct. 37, 38
(U. S. 1941).
7. United States Industrial Chemicals v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp.,
121 F. (2d) 665 (C. C.A. 4th, 1941), cert. granted, 62 Sup. Ct. 187 (U. S. 1941).
S. Defendant built an expensive plant in which to carry on its process commer-
cially, but the District Court found that this had been constructed after plaintiffs appli-
cation for the reissue patent.
9. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. United States Industrial Chemicals,
34 F. Supp. 813 (D. Ad. 1940).
1942]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
no "material variation" between the original and reissue patents. To justify
resort to a reissue, the court held the original patent inoperative to protect
plaintiff's rights completely. The Court of Appeals found the plaintiff's two
patents different in their provisions for the addition of water. It nevertheless
held the difference insufficient to make the District Court "clearly erroneous" 10
and therefore affirmed the decision.
Underlying the decision is an unarticulated philosophy which regards
patents as a sort of property right, the primary purpose of which is to
secure to the inventor a monopoly within broadly construed limits of his
invention. 1 By thus encouraging inventors, the patent laws are thought
to promote individual initiative, progress in the arts, and competitive in-
dustry as by-products. In the course of invention from the crude and
complex to the efficient and simple, it is the initial idea that is considered
deserving of judicial preference and protection as against the improvement,12
which is often merely a copy of the original with inconsequential variations
added to guard against infringement suits.
Liberal application of the reissue statute is one method of achieving this
purpose. 13 For example, although only narrowing of the claim is specifically
mentioned in the statute, long judicial construction has sanctioned broadened
reissues as corrections of a defective specification within the terminology
of the statute.14 The requirement that patents be wholly or partly inopera-
tive in order to entitle their holders to reissues has been liberalized to include
patents which are "narrower than the actual invention"' 1 of the holder and
which therefore do not afford the broad protection against infringement
which they would have had their claims been more inclusive. The statute's
prohibition against the addition of new matter in reissues has been avoided
by minimizing the importance of the additions.'; It has also been held that
the requirement that the error in the specification which the patentee seeks
to correct must have arisen by "inadvertence, accident, or mistake" may be
satisfied by negativing any inference of fraudulent or deceptive intention.1"
Finally, a presumption of validity has been attached in infringement suits
to the finding of the Commissioner of Patents that the reissue is for the
10. The findings of fact made by federal district courts may be set aside on appeal
only when they are "clearly erroneous." FED. RULES Civ. PRoc., 52a (1938).
11. See Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156, 171 (1892).
12. See Hosea, The Dictum of Justice Bradley Examined (1882) 16 A. L. Ruv.
296, 300.
13. See Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156 (1892).
14. See Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218 (U. S. 1832). Applications for a reissue
are often disclaimers plus exceptions which negative the disclaimers so that, under the
pretense of waiving, an enlarged claim is made.
15. Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156, 170 (1892).
16. See Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156 (1892); McArthur v. Brooklyn Railway
Supply Co., 19 Fed. 263 (S. D. N. Y. 1884) (patentee entitled to "equivalent" of original
claim).
17. Perfection Disappearing Bed Co. v. Murphy Wall Bed Co., 266 Fed. 698
(C.C.A. 9th, 1920), cert. denied, 254 U. S. 652 (1920).
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same invention as the original patent.'8 By such liberalization of the reissue
privilege, of which the Carbide & Carbon case is typical, the statute can be
and has been efficacious in preserving and extending patent monopolies.
A more satisfactory climate of opinion, however, which has recently re-
ceived the approval of the United States Supreme Court,'0 regards the
patent not as a property right, but as a "private grant on the public
domain,"20 aimed at the promotion of industrial progress, but to be re-
stricted jealously in the light of public interest. In the past patents were
typically controlled singly, by their inventors; under contemporary economic
organization they are usually controlled in large aggregations, by great cor-
porations. These corporations often use their patent control not to promote
industrial progress but to tax and stifle it.21 Moreover, not inventors, but
corporations as assignees of inventions,22 many of which are mere salable
frills or small improvements logically deduced from the prior art by the
use of expensive research machinery rather than by inventive genius, receive
the rewards which the patent system was intended to confer upon genuine
inventors only.
In the light of this shift in the economics of patents, strict construction
of the reissue statute is essential if the patent system is to fulfill its purpose.
The statute was designed to protect patents from invalidity in the sense
of being legally void, not from invalidity in the sense of not being as broad
as the patentees might desire.2 This is made clear by the statute's mention
of reissues for the purpose of disclaimer and not reissues for addition to
claims. 24 Moreover, a reissue patent with broadened claims is anomalous. -3
If it covers only what was covered by the original or the equivalent of
what was covered by the original, the original could hardly be claimed in-
operative or invalid; if, on the other hand, it covers more than what was
covered in the original, it violates the statutory prohibition against the addi-
tion of new material. Reissues should therefore be granted on applications
based on disclaimer alone and not upon applications which broaden the claims
18. Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156 (1892).
19. Cuno Engineering Corp. v. The Automatic Devices Corp., 62 Sup. Ct. 37
(U. S. 1941).
20. Id. at 41.
21. See HA.=TIox, TNEC RFP., PATENTS AND FREE E 'r xss, 'Monograph 31
(1941). This monograph is the best description of contemporary functioning of the
patent system.
22. ". . . the corporation seeldng to maintain its estate is treated as the man
of science demanding his reward." Id. at 133.
23. Before the establishment of the Patent Office in 1836, few people were competent
to draw up patent specifications, and consequently patents were frequently adjudged
defective and invalid. The reissue statute was designed to protect patentees from this
hazard. See Burr v. Duryee, 68 U. S. 531, 575 (163). For a history of the develop-
ment of broadened reissues, see Rice and Grossman, Reisstued Patents and Inernwing
Rights (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 766, 770 et seq.
24. The qualification "partly or wholly defective or invalid," -vhich was added tw
the Reissue Statute in 1928, may have been designed to include patents of which some
of the claims were invalid while others were valid.
25. Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 354, 355 (1881).
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of the original patents; if the patentee has discovered something new, let
him patent it independently. They should be granted, moreover, only when
the patentee can satisfy the purpose of the statute "to provide that kind of
relief which courts of equity have always given in cases of clear accident." 20
Mere negativing of fraudulent intent should not be held sufficient to satisfy
this purpose. Finally, the courts should attach no presumption of validity
in an infringement suit to the action of the Commissioner of Patents in
granting the reissue. Broadened reissues are almost always secured to cover
a slightly different process or machine developed by a competitor after the
patentee's original grant. In granting or denying a reissue, the Commissioner
is then really settling controversial rights and claims in an ex parte pro-
ceeding.
One device for limiting the scope of reissue patents is the doctrine of
private intervening rights. Developed to prevent the inequitable destruction
of investments built up by the patentee's competitors between the original
grant and the application for a reissue, this doctrine has long enjoyed the
support of lower federal courts ;27 recently it received the approval of the
United States Supreme Court.2 8 Under it, a patentee is held to represent
that he is dedicating to the public whatever he has not claimed. After a
person has expended money for plant or machinery in reliance on such repre-
sentations, the patentee is estopped from asserting an infringement of the
later, reissue patent. By invoking this doctrine, alleged reissue infringers
have obtained personal rights amounting to a permanent license to manu-
facture and sell,29 to dispose of existing stocks,30 and to continue to use
machines on hand.31 The defendant need not prove he relied upon the terms
of the original patent or even that he knew of its existence, for lie is
presumed to have knowledge of the specifications of granted patents
2 just
as he is presumed to know the law. This presumption is in the main justi-
fied because business houses almost always secure the advice of a patent
attorney before embarking upon a manufacturing venture. The attorney's
report ordinarily does not mention patents which might be expanded to
cover the projected manufacture, although he has noted their contemporary
inapplicability.3" But intervening rights may be claimed only for activity
26. Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U. S. 354, 362 (1884).
27. For a review of lower court holdings on intervening rights, see Otis Elevator
Co. v. Atlantic Elevator Co., 47 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
28. Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. National Nut Co., 310 U. S. 281 (1940).
29. Ashley v. Samuel C. Tatum Co., 240 Fed. 979 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
30. Bull Dog Floor Clip Co. v. Munson Mfg. Co., 19 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 8th,
1927).
31. Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. General Refractories Co., 27 F. (2d) 744 (C. C. A.
6th, 1928).
32. Moto Meter Gauge & Equipment Corp. v. E. A. Laboratories, 55 F. (2d) 936
(E. D. N. Y. 1932); Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. National Nut Co., 310 U. S. 281
(1940) semble. It has been held, on the other hand, that the alleged infringer must
take notice of the'-ratentee's right to- a reissue, and hence cannot gain any intervening
rights while it still exists. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co., 108
Fed. 845 (C. C. A. 4th, 1901).
33. See (1940) 8 Gxo. WASHa. L. REV. 985.
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taking place up to the time of the patentee's application for a reissue34 This
limitation seems arbitrary, since the application is not a matter of record,
and the alleged infringer often has no notice of it. Another limitation upon
intervening rights, based upon equity's "clean hands" doctrine, requires that
the defendant's device be an independent invention, not a copy of plaintiff's
device.35 This limitation too seems questionable because the defendant is
not claiming an invention, but merely a device which does not infringe
plaintiff's original patent.
The doctrine of intervening rights, however, fails to protect the important
interest which the public has in restriction of reissues. This task is left for
the doctrine of laches. The laches doctrine rests, like the rule of private
intervening rights,36 upon the proposition that whatever the patentee does
not claim he theoretically dedicates to the public.3- Unless he retracts this
dedication promptly, his laches will give the public a vested right and thus
invalidate his reissue patent. By analogy to the former statutory provision z1
that after a device has been in public use for two years, its inventor may
not patent it, an unexplained delay of two years between the grant of the
original patent and the application for a reissue has ordinarily voided the
reissue.-9 In some cases, furthermore, unexplained delays of less than the
two-year period have been held to invalidate reissue patents 4o especially
when improvements in the art have intervened between the grant of the
original patent and the application for the reissue.4'
Even with strict laches rules, however, the public, despite its interest,
remains without legal means of asserting its rights. As a result, the public
domain is guarded only as it is to the interest of the alleged infringer to
guard it. Had the court in the Carbide & Carbon case recognized this lach
of protection for the public and the need for adjustment of patent law to
modern economics, it might have reversed the decision on a number of grounds.
34. See Otis Elevator Co. v. Atlantic Elevator Co., 47 F. (2d) 545, 549 (C. C. A.
2d, 1931).
35. Albertson & Co. v. Beckley-Ralston Co., 258 Fed. 453 (N. D. Ill. 1919);
Bucher & Gibbs Plow Co. v. International Harvester Co., 211 Fed. 473 (N. D. Ohio
1913).
36. For a review of both rules, see Rice and Grossman, supra note 23, at 775 cl scq.;
(1940) 15 I-eD. L. J. 451.
37. As a matter of practice, inventors usually claim more rather than less of that
to which they are entitled. If a claim is not made, it is probably because the technique
in question is so much a part of a common art that the claim would be useless.
38. 46 STAT. 376 (1930), 35 U. S. C. §31 (1934).
39. Iiller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350 (1881); Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U. S. 96
(1885). The delays of successive holders of the original patent may be tacked together
to make the two-year period. Otis Elevator Co. v. Atlantic Elevator Co., 47 F. (2d)
545 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931). The two-year statutory period has been shortened to one year.
53 STAT. 1212 (1939), 35 U. S. C. § 31 (Supp. 1939). The amendment took effect on
August 5, 1940, and applies to all applications made after it became effective and to all
patents granted on such applications. Presumably the analogous judicially-created laches
rule will likewise be shortened.
40. H. W. Roos Co. v. McMillan, 64 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) (17 munths).
41. Coon v. Wilson, 113 U. S. 268 (1885) (3 months).
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The eighteen months delay in applying for the reissue patent might well have
justified application of the doctrine of laches. The defendant's experiments
with the optional water process were fully sufficient to invest it with an
intervening right against enforcement of the reissue patent.42 Rejecting
liberal construction of the statute, the court should have found the claim of
the optional water process in the reissue patent invalid as an addition of
new material to the original, as the Supreme Court has held in a closely
analogous infringement suit.43 Any of these holdings would have been a
commendable step towards returning the reissue statute to its original func-
tion of encouraging inventive progress within the limits of public interest.
STATUS OF THE SHOP COMMITTEE AS A COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE*
SINCE the advent of the Wagner Act,1 the National Labor Relations
Board has been concerned largely with issues arising from the desire of
employees to be represented by an independent labor organization in gqneral
matters pertaining to the employer-employee relationship. One important
question accompanying the increased recognition that the independent union
is here to stay concerns the position of the employees' shop committee in
carrying out the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
In a recent case before the Labor Board, 2 a contract had been signed by
the Clayton-Lambert Company and Local 155 of the Automobile Workers'
Union3 which included a stipulation that "the employees shall have the right
42. See Otis Elevator Co. v. Atlantic Elevator Co., 47 F. (2d) 545, 548 (C. C. A.
2d, 1931) (patentee should not be allowed to wait until a competitor's experiments
have proved successful and then cover them with a reissue patent).
43. Russell v. Dodge, 93 U. S. 460 (1876). In that case, plaintiff's original patent
covered a process for treating lamb or sheep skin by a compound of which heated fat
liquor was an essential ingredient. The reissue patent, making the use of fat liquor
optional, was held void. However, fat liquor was not produced as a by-product in
the reaction, while in the Carbide & Carbon case, water was so produced and was
therefore present in the reaction whether voluntarily added or not.
*Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co. and Local 155, 34 N. L. R. B. No. 74, (Aug. 20, 1941).
1. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-63 (Supp. 1939).
2. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co. and Local 155, 34 N. L. R. B. No. 74, (Aug.
20, 1941).
3. United Automobile Workers of America (CIO) Local 155, which draws its
membership from sixty companies engaged in the manufacture 'of automobiles or automo-
bile parts on the east side of Detroit, Michigan, maintains a division for the employees
of the Clayton & Lambert Company. Approximately 95% of the 370 eligible employees
are members of this division. About 60% of the eligible employees participate in
elections of the company shop committee, with the voting limited to union members.
Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from Business Agent of Local 155, Nov. 14,
1941.
to be represented by a shop committee who shall be elected in any manner
determined by the employees," and whose members shall have top plant
seniority while in office. 4 In accordance with this provision, the Clayton-
Lambert employees elected eleven of their number shop committeemen.
Subsequently, because of a substantial decrease in orders and the alleged
necessity of taking inventory, the plant was shut down.8 Then, as a con-
dition of reopening before the original contract expired, the company
demanded a new contract and a new shop committee to be composed of
no more than five employees chosen by those actively reemployed by the
company from their own number. The company, in alleging that the old
committee contained many Communists and that its members engendered
disturbances and lack of discipline, singled out four committeemen as being
especially objectionable. While negotiating the new contract, the company
was undoubtedly aware that, since the members of the old committee would
lose their preferred seniority, several of them would not have sufficient
regular seniority ranking to compel their immediate reengagement and, con-
sequently, that they would be ineligible for committee membership. The
company was able, however, to secure a new contractual provision providing
for a revised shop committee to be set up in accordance with its demand.
XWhen the plant reopened, the four particularly objectionable committeemen
were not reemployed.6
When these facts were presented to the NLRB, following charges of un-
fair labor practices brought by the union against the company, it found that
the contractual provision pertaining to replacement of the original shop
committee did not infringe employee rights established by the Wagner Act,7
even though the provision was included at the insistence of the employer.8
4. In addition to recognizing the local as the exclusive representative of tie
company's employees, the contract provided for plant-wide seniority, the elimination Ld
piece work and the substitution of hourly wages therefor, wage increases and a minimum
wage, an eight-hour day, a forty-hour week with time and a half for overtime, and a
grievance procedure.
5. Although the management had informed the shop committee that the closure
was merely temporary, the plant was made to appear as if in a state of indefinite
shut-down.
6. Rehiring was based upon new seniority lists prepared solely by the company
during the shut-down. The Board found that the company unfairly discriminated against
three of these men by reducing their seniority without justification. Clayton & Lambert
Mfg. Co. and Local 155, 34 N. L. R. B. No. 74 (Aug. 20, 1941).
7. "Employees shall have the right of self-organization, to form, join or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.' 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 157 (Supp. 1939).
8. "(4) The term 'representatives' includes any 'individual or labor organizatiun.
(5) The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency
or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of vurk."
49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 152 (Supp. 1939).
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In relationships between employer and employees, the Clayton-Lambert
shop committee0 played a very active role. After joining with the nanagc-
ment in preparing seniority lists, this committee protested any deviation
from the lists during lay-offs and rehirings, and resolved administrative
difficulties arising in connection with inter-department and inter-job transfer
of employees. Production standards for the particular jobs were determined
by negotiation between the committee and the management. The committee
also investigated company proposals to abolish certain departments for the
purpose of discovering whether unionism was being undermined by an un-
warranted subletting of work. Other similar functions included ascertaining
the company's reasons for proposed shut-downs and discussing the question
of reopenings, explaining the management's position to the employees, main-
taining and fostering the employees' union spirit, and watching for all viola-
tions of the general contract. Lastly, the committee sought to satisfy the
individual employee's grievances when such matters were not settled by
negotiations between the foreman and the shop steward.
Performance of these functions, unhampered by employer interference, is
essential to a full realization of the collective bargaining process. Because
settlement by the shop committee usually terminates a controversy, it is
incongruous to permit the employer to sit on both sides of the table when
labor problems are considered at this initial stage, since he is not allowed
to do so if he should ultimately be compelled to deal with the local. If an
employer can eliminate those militant committeemen who are objectionable
to him, the local and the plant workers are divested of a large share of
bargaining equality. When shop committeemen know that their tenure is
subject to their employer's whims, their pro-employee ardor may be mollified. 10
It may be argued, however, that the present shop committee is primarily
concerned with grievance adjustment. Even so, firmness is essential." When
the independent union's position has been established and the general agree-
ment signed, the individual employee becomes interested primarily in seeing
the advantages obtained by the local applied directly to his individual prob-
lems. If he has a complaint, he turns to the shop committee, and his judg-
ment of the success of collective bargaining is based largely on the committee's
ability to compel the management to redress his grievance. But a non-militant
committee is not likely to present employee grievances with the requisite
9. For a list of functions to be performed by shop committeemen and stewards, see
UAW-CIO INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE COURSE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (Lesson
Four). See also HANDBOOK FOR C. I. 0. LOCAL INDUSTRIAL UNIONS (1939) 38.
10. "It is the committeeman's duty to represent in all relationships with manage-
ment the interests of the workers as the workers see them . . . little impartiality can
be expected from the company." UAW-CIO, How To WIN FOR TII1 UNION: A
DISCUSSION FOR U. A. W. SmWARDS AND COMMITTEEMEN (3d ed. 1941).
11. "It is no exaggeration to say that the progress of the establishment of collective
bargaining as an industrial modus operandi can best be judged by how smoothly meshed
are the gears of the grievance adjustment machinery. . . . If grievance adjustment
is the alpha it is also the omega of the collective bargaining process." ROSENFARUI,
THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY (1940) 196. See also BROOKS, WHEN LABOR ORGANIZES
(1937) 220, 221.
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vigor and determination. When this condition exists, grievances accumulate,
employee dissatisfaction is engendered in the plant, and union spirit is under-
mined, resulting ultimately in a weakening of the local's position at the con-
ference table.
It would seem, therefore, that obtaining the benefits inherent in each
provision of the contract is as important as securing the contract.12 But
the Board has assumed the position that the functions which the committee
performed relative to achieving these benefits, while classifiable as bargain-
ing, were merely supplementary to the collective bargaining activities of
Local 155 and the International; consequently, it was not essential that they
be conducted by freely chosen representatives.1 3 In so deciding, the Buard
failed to recognize the mutual dependence of the inside and outside repre-
sentatives upon each other in respect to their attainment of the objectives
of the collective bargaining procedure.' 4 The general agreement secured by
Local 155 and the daily agreements obtained by the shop committee in its
settlement of grievances are each component parts of the whole process 15
of collective bargaining which is protected by Section 7 of the AcL1
A further question arises as to whether the class of employees from which
the shop committee is to be chosen is a proper subject of collective bargain-
mng. Here the Clayton-Lambert Company refused to enter into an agreement
12. "This power of organized labor is brought to bear against management through
the shop stewards and plant committeemen, who are elected representatives of the
organized workers. On these coimndttcemcn or stewards depends the success or failure
of labor in the automobile industry." UAW-CIO INTERZATIONAL CQ1Rsro:;oZ:;Nc
CouRsE, CoLLECTIvE BARGAINING (Lesson Four) 2. Even more emphatic is the caveat
expressed in the UAWXT-CIO educational booklet distributed to shop committeemen and
stewards. "The best contract in the world may be signed between union officers and
corporation executives; but, unless that contract is enforced and put into effect through-
out the shop it is worth a little bit less than the paper it's written on." UNW-CIO,
How To ViN FoR THE Uxiox: A DiscussIoN FOR U. A. V. STEwArV s AND COM M--
xIEN (3d ed. 1941).
13. See "E. Conclusions with respect to interference, restraint, and coercion during
the shut-down, and as to discrimination against shop committeemen." Cla ton & Lambert
Mfg. Co. and Local 155, 34 N. L. R. B., No. 74 (Aug. 20, 1941).
14. The dependence of the local and the international upun shop cummitteemen
and stewards is acknowledged forcefully throughout the UAWV-CIO educational bozAlet,
How To WIN -oR THE UoNI : A Discussiox FoR U. A. V. ST\wARPS AND COMi-
3fl'IErN _, (3d ed. 1941). The principle that the general agreement itLelf merely
provides a modus vivendi as a guide to future conduct, with the result dependent the
outcome of day-to-day human endeavors, has been recognized. See NLRB v. Highland
Park Mfg. Co., 110 F. (2d) 632 (C. C.A. 4th, 1940).
15. See UAW-CIO ITmNATIO.AL CoRREsPoEcmExcm CoumsE, CoLLEcrnE B,%rGAo -
ING (Lesson Five) 4.
16. This concept was once recognized by present Board Chairman Millis vhile
he was acting as an arbitrator. Arbitration between UAW and General Motors Corp.,
Chevrolet Gear & Axle Division, 7 L. R. R. 922 (1940), wherein Dr. Millis stated:
"The success of collective bargaining depends quite as much upon personal qualities,
attitudes, and the handling of grievances as upon the terms of agreements negotiated
around a conference table."
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unless committee membership was restricted to those employees who were
actively reengaged. Its motive undoubtedly was to eliminate the objection-
able members of the old committee, but the Board declared that the company
could bargain for such a provision, and that there was no unlawful inter-
ference with the right of employees to choose their own representatives.'1
The Board argued that such provisions were customary in the automobile
industry. It is quite possible, however, that the custom is not the product
of any bargaining negotiation, but rather was born of the employees' desire
to insure that the shop committee representatives would be chosen from
among their own members.'
8
It might be argued that the employees waived their rights by their ac-
ceptance of the provision through Local 155. But this objection has been
refuted in the past by the courts'0 and by the Board itself20 on the ground
that an employer cannot induce his employees to refrain from demanding the
performance of the duties which he owes to them under the Act. If any
such provision is included in a contract, the employees may invalidate it
if subsequently they so desire. Such a desire is conceivable in this case,
because those employees not reengaged have an interest in the conditions
of employment to which they probably will return.
It seems, therefore, that the Board has underestimated the usefulness of
the functions performed by the shop committee, and that it has withheld
from employees their right to representatives of their own free choice in
an important element of collective bargaining. The Board, of course, should
not be expected to draw up a list of bargaining activities with the purpose
of declaring that every person engaged in one of the listed activities is im-
mune from all employer objection. Situations may exist in which the em-
ployees will benefit from a change in representatives. But the principal
case seems not to have presented such a situation, and the Board should
not have countenanced so substantial an interference by the employer.
21
17. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co. and Local 155, 34 N. L. R. B. No. 74 (Aug. 20,
1941).
18. Of the three principal employers in the automobile industry, General Motors,
Ford, and Chrysler, only the General Motors contract requires that committeemen shall
be actively employed in the plant. See 6 L. R. R. Man. 1180, 1184 (1940). The
Chrysler contract permits committeemen to be chosen from employees who are on the
seniority list. See 5 L. R. R. Man. 1055, 1057 (1939).
19. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 350 (1940), aff'g as mod., 104 F.
(2d) 655 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), enf'g as rood., 7 N. L. R. B. 537 (1938); McQuay-Norris
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 116 F. (2d) 748 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), nf'g, 21 N. L. R. B. 709
(1940).
20. Peter Pan Co., Inc. and United Garment Workers of America (AFL), 21
N. L. R. B. 522 (1940) ; Killefer Mfg. Corp. and Steel Workers Organization Committee
(CIO) 22 N. L. R. B. 484 (1940). See Donnelly Garment Co. and Internat'l Ladies
Garment Workers Union, 21 N. L. R. B. 164 (1940).
21. For a dictum that the legislature intended the collective bargaining process to
be free from even subtle employer interference, see International Ass'n of Machinists
v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940), aff'g, 110 F. (2d) 29 (App. D. C. 1939). At the very
least, it may be said that the employer in the principal case subtly interfered with the
collective bargaining process, even if that phrase be narrowly construed.
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NLRB JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES WHICH
VIOLATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS*
REPEATED victories in the courts have firmly established the National Labor
Relations Board as protector of Labor's rights to organize free from inter-
ference and to bargain collectively with employers. Where, however, pre-
liminary negotiations have been successfully concluded by the signing of a
collective agreement by an accredited union, the continuing jurisdiction of
the NLRB is less well defined. hVhether the Board may countenance or
assist any challenge to the majority status of a union protected by some
form of unexpired exclusive contract, has been the subject of constant
debate.1 Of perhaps even greater obscurity has been the authority of the
Board over discriminatory labor practices when they occur subsequent to
the inauguration of a direct contractual relationship between the employer
and an approved bargaining agent of a majority of his employees. This
latter problem develops in perhaps its most crucial form where the particular
unfair practice has been expressly proscribed by the terms of the collective
agreement.
The issues involved in such a situation came before the courts for the first
time in the recent case of NLRB v. Nczvark Morning Ledgcr.2 An employee
had been discharged by the Ledger Company because of her membership
and activity in the American Newspaper Guild. By this action the company
breached a collective agreement which contained a specific provision that
employees should not be discharged because of their union affiliations.3 Either
the employee or the union might have gone into court and asserted a cause
of action in breach of contract against the employer. Instead of resorting
to judicial remedies, however, both the union and its injured member joined
in petitioning the NLRB for protection and relief against the discharge
as an unfair labor practice within the definition of the National Labor
Relations Act.4 There was no claim that the NLRB had powers to remedy
the breach of contract as such;5 whether jurisdiction under the Act could
*NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger, 120 F. (2d) 262 (C.C. A. 3d, 1941), cecr.
denied, 10 U. S. L. W\rmEM 3195 (U. S. 1941).
1. See Comment (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 465.
2. 120 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), cert. denied, 10 U. S. L. Wt= 3195
(U. S. 1941).
3. The contract stipulated that "The Publisher shall nut discharge or otherwise
discriminate against any employee because of Guild membership or because of his
activity in the Guild." The NLRB found as a fact that the discharge had been for
such activity. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 21 NLRB 923, 1017 (1940).
4. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (Supp. 1939). The Act will hereafter
be cited by section number only.
5. It has usually been assumed that the Labor Board is not authorized to take such
action. See Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts (1938) 4S Y.
L. J. 195, 198, n. 5; Wolf, The Enforcement of Collective Labor Agrcesents: A Pro-
posal (1938) 5 LAw & Co-rz.T . PROB. 273, 282; Comment (1939) 52 H,%nv. L ria'.
970, 973, n. 29, 974. The NLRB can void a collective bargaining agrcemcit if it is
the result or cause of unfair labor practices. National Licorice Co. v. XLB, 309 U. S.
350 (1940); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197 (1938); XLRB v.
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be based on the commission of an act already outlawed by private contract
was at least debatable.6 The Board, however, without considering the juris-
dictional issues, ordered the Ledger Company to reinstate the dismissed
employee and to reimburse her for lost back wages. 7
The Board's petition to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for enforce-
ment of the order was initially denied, however, on the ground that the
discriminatory discharge did not constitute an unfair labor practice within
the Board's jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act.8 According
to the court, the discharge of any employee for union activity was an unfair
labor practice only where it had "the effect of interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the right of collective bargaining."
No unfair practice could, therefore, exist after the bargaining process had
successfully culminated in a contract defining employer-employee relations
and enforceable in the courts.Y0
The decision denying Board jurisdiction was, however, not allowed to
stand; on rehearing the court, sitting en banc, completely reversed its earlier
position.'1 In so doing it asserted a much broader conception of collective
bargaining and, therefore, of the unfair labor practices outlawed by the Act.
Stating that the right of collective bargaining is "not a detached or isolated
procedure which, once reflected in a written agreement, becomes a final
and permanent result,"'12 a majority of the court concluded that protection
by the NLRB against unfair labor practices must necessarily continue as
long as the prospect of future bargaining remains.
National Motor Bearing Co., 105 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) (an agreement
which is the cause or result of an unfair labor practice is itself an unfair labor practice).
Where the employer secures an agreement in the time lapse between the hearings of
the Board and its order, it has been held that once the jurisdiction of the Bo-ird has
been plainly established no agreement by private parties can affect it. Compare NLRB
v. General Motors Corp., 116 F. (2d) 306 (C. C.A. 7th, 1940), and NLRB v. Oregon
Worsted Co., 96 F. (2d) 193 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938), with NLRB v. Delaware-New
Jersey Ferry, 90 F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937).
6. The legal uncertainty on this point is attested by the variety of judicial views
expressed in the Newark Mlorning Ledger case itself. See dissenting opinion of Judge
Clark in NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F. (2d) 262, 269 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941),
and original decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in NLRB
v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F. (2d) 262 (C.C.A. 3d, 1941). Although
review of this case by the Supreme Court has not been granted, it is likely that the
issue will continue to be litigated until a conflict between circuit courts of appeals is
reached and the Supreme Court passes upon it.
7. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 21 NLRB 988 (1940).
8. NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
9. Ibid. Unfair labor practices are defined by the five subdivisions of Section 8
of the Act. The first of these relates to discharge of an employee for union activity.
Under it a practice is unfair if it interferes with any of the rights granted under
Section 7 of the Act. That section guarantees the right of collective bargaining and
all rights incident thereto.
10. The enforceability of the contract is an assumption by the court which, as is
shown below, may not be warranted in certain jurisdictions.
11. NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F. (2d) 262 (C. C.A. 3rd, 1941).
12. Ibid.
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The chief argument against the court's ultimate conclusion rests in a
contention that the Board is not the proper tribunal to enforce valid labor
contracts. Board enforcement of such contracts is claimed to be contrary
to legislative intent; no such power is expressly granted by the Act,13 and
amendments proposed to effectuate this end, though repeatedly suggested,
have never been adopted by Congress.' 4 Furthermore, the dissenting judge
questioned the wisdom of giving power to enforce contracts to the same
agency that protects their formation -a step, to him, towards dictation of the
substance of the agreements.15
In evaluating these arguments it should be noted that the court did not
assert that the NLRB has any direct power to enforce the general pro-
visions of collective agreements.:6 The dissent, therefore, would seem princi-
pally to be objecting to the fact that the majority opinion permits indirect
Board enforcement of certain contract violations by calling them unfair labor
practices. But the argument, even as so qualified, is only partially accurate;
under the decision the Board might enforce certain rights which could also
be subject to court action, but neither would nor could enforce any contract
provision which is not independently an unfair labor practice as defined
by the Act. And the abortive amendments do not prove a contrary legis-
lative intent since the amendments sought to make any breach of a collective
agreement an unfair labor practice rather than proscribing only those which
would be unfair practices independently of the breach.' 7
An alternative objection to the decision is that it might destroy any
function of fair labor practice guarantees in collective agreements. With the
availability of the "more advantageous" Labor Board remedy, employees,
it is claimed, will rarely resort to court proceedings.'8 They might even
13. Rice, The Legal Significmce of Labor Contracts Under the National Labor
Relations Act (1939) 37 MfIc. L. REv. 693; Hearinqs before Committee on Education
and Labor on S. 1000, 76th Cong., 1st! Sess. (1939) 998, 1607. William Leiserson, nmw
a member of the NLRB, said in the hearings, ". . . the authority of the Labor
Relations Board ends, at bringing the employer and employee tcgether. . . . In
other words, it is like the novel, when the hero and heroine get together they live
happily ever after." Senator Wagner himself has questioned Board jurisdiction after
a valid contract has gone into effect Wagner Challenges Critics of His Act, N. Y.
Times, July 25, 1937, Magazine Section, p. 1.
14. Projected amendments advocated that Section 8 be amended to make breach
of a collective bargaining agreement an unfair labor practice, and that the NLRB or
some other administrative agency be given the authority to administer the contract.
Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935) 715, 720; Comment (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 970.
15. See dissenting opinion of Judge Clark in NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger
Co., 120 F. (2d) 262, 275-76 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1941).
16. See note 5 stupra.
17. But see Pipin, Enforcement of Rights Under Collective Barqaidng Agrecments
(1939) 6 U. oF CEaI. L. REv. 651; Slichter, The Government and Collecti v Bargaint
(1935) 178 ANNALS 107.
18. It is possible, of course, that in some instances of discharge contractual damages
would be higher than the back pay and other remedies avrarded by the Board. Cf.
Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts (1938) 48 YALE L J. 195.
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be required to exhaust the administrative remedies before resorting to court
action,' 9 and denial of relief by the Board might be res judicata in a sub-
sequent legal action.
2 0
While the decision may, in fact, result in a deemphasis of such clauses in
collective agreements (at least to the extent that the unions do not secure
added protection by a choice of remedies), denial of administrative proce-
dure in favor of the judicial alone may prove highly disadvantageous to
Labor in the protection of its admitted rights. Collective bargaining agree-
ments are unenforceable in many jurisdictions under certain conditions or
enforceable only by inadequate remedies. Under the laws of some states,
for example, unions, as unincorporated associations, may neither sue nor
be sued.21 Likewise, individual employees may be hampered in obtaining
redress by requirements that they ratify or accept the collective agreement. "
Even where a suit is permitted, recovery may be limited to an inadequate
damage remedy; reinstatement after discharge and particularly preservation
of seniority status are often denied.23 Nor should the positive advantages
of the administrative process be ignored: simple and expedited procedure,
relaxed rules of evidence, and specialization by the examining tribunal.
Any unfortunate consequences which might conceivably follow as a
result of Board jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, even though they
are proscribed by contract, would seem to be far outweighed by the policy
considerations favorable to the majority opinion. Collective bargaining, though
occurring on specific occasions, must be a continuous process; even where
there is an existing contract, it will not be of permanent duration or cover
all eventualities, and additional bargaining will, therefore, be necessary in the
future. Recognition was given to this truism by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Company 24 where the Court indicated that
the refusal of an employer to consider proposed changes in or interpretation
of a labor agreement would be an unfair dabor practice. It follows that it
19. Compare Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938);
see Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 981.
20. See Comment, Res Jidicata in Administrative Law (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1250,
1268-72.
21. O'Jay Spread Co. v. Hicks, 185 Ga. 507, 195 S. E. 564 (1938); Brown v.
Protestant Episcopal Church, 8 F. (2d) 149 (E. D. La. 1925); Malloy v. Carroll,
287 Mass. 376, 191 N. E. 661 (1934) ; St. Paul Typothetae v. Bookbinders, 94 Mim. 351,
102 N. W. 725 (1905) ; Saxer v. Democratic Committee of Erie County, 161 Misc. 35,
291 N. Y. Supp. 18 (Sup. Ct. 1936); West v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 103 W. Va. 417,
137 S. E. 654 (1927).
22. See Swart v. Huston, 117 P. (2d) 576 (Kan. 1941); Rotnofsky v. Capitol
Distributors, 262 App. Div. 521, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 563 (1st Dep't 1941). See also Witmer,
Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 195, 227-29; Wolf,
The Enforcement of Collective Labor Agreements: A Proposal (1938) 5 LAW &
CONTEMp. PRou. 273, 275.
23. This is often done on a rationale that personal service contracts may not be
specifically enforced. See Pipin, Enforcement of Rights Under Collective Bargaining
Agreements (1939) 6 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 651, 659-60; Witmer, Collective Labor Agree-
inents in the Courts (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 195, 203-05.
24. 306 U. S. 332, 342 (1939).
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is necessary to prevent coercion and discrimination in labor relations even
after an agreement has been consummated, if the mandates of the Act are
to be fully carried out.
Where the union contract lacks a clause prohibiting "unfair labor prac-
tices," the dissenting position might be susceptible of an even more un-
fortunate result. In such circumstances the Board's jurisdiction over any
subsequent discriminatory practice, might, under the minority view, be denied
on grounds that the collective bargaining process had reached its fruition
in the contract. Or this extreme position might be avoided, and the Board
allowed to take jurisdiction in the absence of any alternative legal remedy.
But in that case the availability of administrative rather than legal relief
would depend arbitrarily on whether the particular union contract happened
to include prohibitions against unfair practices within its express terms.
TRADING IN COMMODITY FUTURES UNDER FEDERAL
INCOME TAX STATUTES*
SINCE trading in commodity futures' can be branded a wagering transac-
tion,2 its legality has frequently been challenged. 3 Despite occasional judicial
hostility, however, its validity is now firmly established.4 As a legitimate
* Commissioner v. Covington, 120 F. (2d) 768 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); Commissioner
v. Farmers & Ginners Cotton Oil Co., 120 F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), cert. dcnicd,
62 Sup. Ct. 185 (U. S. 1941).
1. For a general description of trading in commodity futures on organized com-
medity exchanges, see HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING UPON On A IZED Co1011NoIY MAR-
Knrs (1932); BAER AND WOODRUFF. CoMMODrrY ExcHAxxGEs (3d ed. 1935).
2. A contract to sell for future delivery is invalid at common lay:, if the parties
intend, instead of actual delivery, a settlement of differences at the time the transaction
is closed. Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499 (1884) ; Lyons Milling Co. v. Goffe & Car-
kener, 46 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931) ; Wilhite v. Houston, 200 Fed. 390 (C. C. A.
8th, 1912) ; Hoover Grain Co. v. Amundson, 70 N. D. 186, 293 N. "W. 196 (19-{0). The
intention of one party does not invalidate the contract. Browne v. Thorn, 260 U. S. 137
(1922); cf. Williamson v. Majors, 169 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 5th, 1909). For a discussion
of the common law rule and cases, see MEYER, THE L.W\" or STOCK Bnoxons A-D S-roz:
EXcHANGES (1931) § 34.
3. The issue usually arises in two types of action: (1) suits by brokers for com-
missions or for advances made on the customer's account [see, e.g., Ware v. Pearsons,
173 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909)]; (2) suits by customers for margins deposited with
the broker under statutes allowing recovery against the winner of a wager [Van Pelt
v. Schauble, 68 N. J. L. 638, 54 Atl. 437 (1903)]. See Comment (1927) 40 HAP,. L.
Rev. 638, n. 11.
4. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236 (1905) ; MIullinix
v. Hubbard, 6 F. (2d) 109 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Gettys v. Newburger, 272 Fed. 249
(C. C. A. 8th, 1921); Springs v. James, 137 App. Div. 110, 121 N. Y. Supp. 1054 (1st
Dep't 1910). The set-off or ringing-off transactions under the rules of the exchanges are
considered to be legal deliveries. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., supra.
For a history of the legality of the future contract, see HoF2'tta, op. di. supra note 1, at
112. For a consideration of federal statutory regulation of futures trading, see Comment
(1941) 54 HAzv. L. REv. 1373.
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form of investment, the purchase or sale of commodity future contracts, stan-
dardized under rules of organized exchanges,5 has been sanctioned by busi-
ness and the law. When used as a hedging device, moreover, dealing in futures
operates as a valuable form of price insurance by offsetting present risks
in cash transactions.6 But identification of a particular transaction as an il-
legal speculation or a valid business institution is a recurrent problem for the
courts.
When losses have resulted from trading in commodity futures, the deter-
mination of their deductibility under income tax statutes makes problems of
identification acute. If a transaction is declared by the courts to be a wager,
specific statutory provision permits deduction of losses only to the extent
of gains from similar speculations.7 Where, on the other hand, the dealing
in futures is found to be a legitimate investment, doubt arises whether deducti-
bility is governed by the capital loss limitation8 or fully allowed tinder the
ordinary loss provisions.9 And in the case of the hedge the application of the
statute has not been fully settled. Since hedging is almost entirely a form
of price insurance, losses from it might be held fully deductible as ordinary
and necessary business expenses.' 0 Where, however, the distinction from
investment is blurred, the hedging transaction might be subject to the re-
stricted deductibility of the capital loss.
The treatment of commissions creates an additional difficulty in the compu-
tation of taxes on futures dealings. While commissions paid in strict hedg-
ing transactions are apparently classifiable with losses as business expenses,
11
their deductibility in cases of legitimate investment remains undefined. De-
spite taxpayer claims that they are items of expense, it is settled in ordinary
securities investment by non-dealers that commissions on purchases must
be added to purchase price for computing capital gains or losses.' 2 Commis-
sions on sales on the other hand have been allowed full deduction as expens-
es. 13 Since, however, commissions in futures trading are ordinarily payable
5. See BAE AND WOODRUFF, op. cit. supra note 1, at 6.
6. For various definitions and descriptions of hedging, see Browne v. Thorn, 260
U. S. 137, 139 (1922); Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236,
249 (1905) ; Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Sloan, 272 Fed. 615, 620 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921) :
Fagerberg v. Phoenix Flour Mills Co., 50 Ariz. 227, 242, 71 P. (2d) 1022, 1028-29
(1937); Whorley v. Patton-Kjose Co., 90 Mont. 461, 475, 5 P. (2d) 210, 214 (1931);
BAE AND WOODRUFF, op. cit. supra note 1, at 86 et seq.; Patterson, Hedging and Wager-
ing on Produce Exchanges (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 843, 846.
7. INT. REV. CODE §23(h) (1939).
8. INT. REV. CODE § 117(d) (1939). See Staerker v. United States, 4 C. C. H.
1938 Fed. Tax Serv. 1f 9514 (N. D. Tex. 1938), appeal dismissed, 4 C. C. H. 1940 Fed.
Tax Serv. 1f 9339 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
9. IxT. REv. CODE §§ 23(e) [individuals], 23(f) [corporations] (1939).
10. Ben Grote, 41 B. T. A. 247 (1940) ; Bacon v. Reinecke, 26 F. (2d) 705 (N. D.
Ill. 1928), aff'd, 54 F. (2d) 1078 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929) (by implication) ; cf. Commissioner
v.: Banfield, 122 F. (2d) 1017 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941). See G. C. M. 17322, XV-2 Cum.
BULL. 151 (1936).
11. G. C. M. 17322, XV-2 Cum. BULL. 151 (1936).
12. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79 (1938).
13. Neuberger v. Commissioner, 104 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), rev'd on
another issue, 311 U. S. 83 (1940).
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only on consummation of the commodity transaction,14 the applicability of
rules in securities has been doubtful.
These uncertainties surrounding the taxation of futures have been partially
dispelled by recent decisions of the Fifth Circuit.1' Losses from hedging
were declared fully deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.1
Investment futures, found to fall within the statutory definition of capital
assets, were made subject to the limitation on capital losses.-, In addition,
by extending the rule on securities purchases to commissions on sales, the
court held that all commissions paid in futures investment transactions must
be assimilated in purchase and sale price. 18
The classification of losses from hedging, confirming already existing au-
thority, is justified commercially and legally. Since the hedge has been judi-
cially e.sempted from the stigma of wagering,' 0 it should escape the specific
tax provision for speculating losses.20 The cost of hedging, moreover, includ-
ing losses sustained, seems clearly to satisfy criteria which the courts have
formulated for ordinary and necessary business expenses. Now an estab-
lished business institution, hedging transactions are comprised of purchases
and sales of the cash commodity and futures in equivalent amounts, a pur-
chase of one balancing a sale of the other.21 Since cash and futures markets
tend to move together,2 gains in one market offset losses in the other. The
hedger is primarily concerned with insuring himself against wide price fluc-
tuations in the cash market to make certain his ordinary operating profits.P
Thus used as protection against risks, and not as capital investment, hedging
offers the only method of price insurance available to manufacturers, deal-
ers, and others who must make commodity contracts of purchase and sale
in advance.24 Losses from hedging, therefore, conform to the judicial re-
quirement that business expenses, to be deductible, must be helpful to, or
14. See George W. Covington, 42 B. T. A. 601, 606 (1940); HoFrraAsi, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 157.
15. Commissioner v. Covington, 120 F. (2d) 768 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); Commis-
sioner v. Farmers & Ginners Cotton Oil Co., 120 F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), cert.
denied, 62 Sup. Ct. 185 (U. S. 1941).
16. This statement, however, was dictum. The decision was that the transactions in
question were not hedges. Commissioner v. Farmers & Ginners Cotton Oil Co., 120 F.
(2d) 772, 774 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), cert. denied, 62 Sup. Ct. 185 (U. S. 1941).
17. Commissioner v. Covington, 120 F. (2d) 768, 770 (C. C. A. Sth, 1941).
18. Commissioner v. Covington, 120 F. (2d) 768, 771 (C. C. A. Sth, 1941).
19. See notes 4 and 6 .spra.
20. NT. RFV. CODE § 23(h) (1939). For decisions on wagering losses under the tax
statutes, see 1 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax. Serv. , 13,760.
21. For a clear discussion of the operation of the hedge, see Patterson, slpra note 6,
at 846.
22. "Hedging is based upon the assumption that cash and future prices will parallel
each other in movement after due allowance has been made for any seasonal trend in cash
prices. In the broader price movements, this assumption . .. is substantially accurate."
Horrxax, op. cit. supra note 1, at 381. See also id. at 254 ct seq.
23. HOFFANA, op. cit. supra note 1, at 387; see Lyons Milling Co. v. Goffe & Car-
kener, 46 F. (2d) 241, 247 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931).
24. See G. C. 11. 17322, XV-2 Cum. BT-u.. 151, 152 (1936).
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proximately result from, the taxpayer's business.2r Gains realized from
hedges, moreover, are reflected in net income either by compensating for
losses in the commodity transaction or by offsetting fluctuations in the mar-
ket price of the commodity through inclusion in net income. Consequently
allowance of full deductibility of losses ordinarily has no appreciable effect
on net income.
26
The investment future contract, however, lacks both insurance and account-
ing grounds on which to base a claim of full deductibility. 27 Taxpayers
assert, nevertheless, that such losses are allowable under the ordinary loss
provisions, 28 rather than subject to the capital loss limitation.29 The basis for
this argument is that under the statutory definition of a capital asset property
must be held by the taxpayer,30 and there must be a sale or exchange to pro-
duce taxable capital gain or loss. 31 It is contended that the trader in future
contracts does not hold property, but simply executory contracts to buy prop-
erty in the future if the futures are not closed out on the exchange before
the time for delivery. The process of purchase and extinguishment of con-
tracts, moreover, is alleged not to represent a sale or exchange,3
2
The effect of this argument, however, is to drive legitimate investment
into a category of wagering transaction.33 Both business and law, on the other
hand, have consistently treated future contracts as representing purchases and
sales of property in order to distinguish them from illegal wagering bargains.
Legal rationales applied to the future contract, moreover, add an additional
refutation to the argument. On one hand, the contract slips evidencing the
purchases and sales are considered bought and sold notes. 34 According to
other authorities, the commodity itself is bought or sold by means of the con-
tract.3, Then the ringing-off or set-off transaction that closes out the future
25. Deputy v. duPont, 308 U. S. 488 (1940); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111
(1933) ; Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145 (1928) ; Pyne v. United States, 35
F. Supp. 81 (Ct. Cl. 1940). See Comments (1941) 27 VA. L. REv. 349, (1939) 13 Trn,.
L. Q. 511.
26. See G. C. M. 17322, XV-2 Cum. BuLL. 151, 152 (1936). Net income will be
affected in the unexpected case when the two markets, cash and futures, fall sharply
out of line so as to produce a large loss or gain. See note 22 supra.
27. See G. C. M. 17322, XV-2 Cum. BULL. 151 (1936).
28. INT. REv. CODE §§23(e), (f) (1939).
29. The present statute provides that long-term capital losses (from sale or exchange
of a capital asset held over 18 months) shall be allowed in full, but short-term capital
losses (asset held less than 18 months) shall be allowed only to the extent of short-term
capital gains. INT. REv. CODE § 117(d) (1939). The limitation controlling the Covinglon
case restricted allowable capital losses to $2,000, plus capital gains. Revenue Act of 1936,
§ 117(d).
30. INT. REV. CODE § 117(a) (1) (1939).
31. INT. REv. CODE § 117(a) (2) et seq. (1939).
32. See Commissioner v. Covington, 120 F. (2d) 768, 769 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
33. Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499 (1884); Cleage v. Laidley, 149 Fed. 346 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1906).
34. Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481 (1893); see George W. Covington, 42 B. T. A. 601,
605 (1940) ; HOFFMAN, op. cit. mrpra note 1, at 111.
35. GARSIDE, CoTToN GOES To MARKET (1935) 136.
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on the exchange is in legal effect a delivery of the commodity. ° This ration-
ale derives support from the fact that in clearance the commodity is regarded
as being bought and sold by the clearing house aT Either theory characterizes
the future contract as property, capable of ownership and of being trans-
ferred by the parties to the contract or by operation of law.38
Conceding the future contract of the legitimate investment type tu be
property within the capital asset definition, it must further be shown not to
be one of the kinds of property expressly excluded. 9 If the transaction is
entered into as an investment, that very fact would appear to disqualify the
contract as an exception. A dealer4 0 in futures can presumably include his
contracts in the excluded categories. Futures are his stock in trade, to be sold
to customers in the ordinary course of business.4 ' The trader for investment,
however, buys for his own account and for the sake of profit.0 2 Congress, in
addition, has removed any doubt as to the application of the section to trading
losses.4 3 Previously one who made it his business to trade in securities or
futures might be excepted.44 Now he is clearly labeled a capitalist,4 5 and the
deductibility of his losses is limited.
The treathient of commissions, however, is complicated by both the statute
and legal precedents. Costs incurred in acquiring and selling property are
ordinarily classified as capital expenditures, to be added to the purchase price
or deducted from the sale price of the property.40 In tax computation, either
36. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 193 U. S. 236 (1905).
37. HoFF a , op. cit. mtpra note 1, at 203.
38. See the analysis of futures transactions in Valley Waste Mills v. Page, 115 F.
(2d) 466, 468 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cert. denicd, 61 S. Ct. 549 (U. S. 1941).
39. ". . . stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the ta:%-
able year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business, or property, used in the trade or business, of a character
which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 23(1)." L.T. R-v.
CODE § 117(a) (1) (1939). See U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.117-1.
40. See the definition of a dealer in securities in U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 1922(c)-5.
41. This is reflected in the permission given dealers to inventory securities held for
the purpose of resale. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(c)-5. See Helvering v. Fried, 259
U. S. 175 (1936).
42. Schafer v. Helvering, 299 U. S. 171 (1936); Edward E. Trost, 34 B. T. A. 24
(1936); Oil Shares, Inc., 29 B. T. A. 664 (1934); G. C. M. 9656, X-2 Cus. BUr.. 127
(1931).
43. See Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U. S. 83, 85 ct seq. (1940). The words "to
customers" were inserted after "held primarily for sale" in the Revenue Act of 1934.
See 0. L. Burnett, 40 B. T. A. 605, 607 (1939), aff'd on lids point, 118 F. (2d) 659 (C.
C. A. Sth, 1941) ; G. C. M1. 21497, 1939-2 Cum. BULL 187, 188 (1939).
44. Charles W. Purdy, 36 B. T. A. 572 (1937); Francis 11. Weld, 31 B. T. A. 600
(1934); G. C. Mf. 9958, X-2 Cum. BuLuT 158 (1931).
45. Cf. United States v. New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, 263 U. S. 611, 619
(1924).
46. Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 381 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) (fee
for negotiation of long-term lease) ; Hutton v. Commissioner, 39 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A.
5th, 1930) (commissions on purchase of securities); Simmons Co. v. Commissioner, 33 F.
(2d) 75 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929) (bankers' commissions paid by corporate taxpayer on sale
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capital gain is reduced or capital loss is increased by such charges.47 Although
commissions paid on futures investment are paid only on the consummation
of the transaction, they would seem clearly to be costs incident to the acquisi-
tion and sale of property. Tax policy and commercial usage, therefore, sup-
port the court's refusal to allow their deduction as business expenses. Despite
the cogency of reasons for its adoption, however, the decision required rever-
sal of previous authority. The Winill rule for securities transactions was
confined to forbidding deduction of commissions on purchases as expenses
and calling for their addition to purchase price.48 A subsequent circuit court
decision refused to extend the Supreme Court's principle to sales commis-
sions. 49 Adhering to both decisions, the Board of Tax Appeals found the tax
treatment of securities appropriate for futures transactions.50 To apply the
two rules to futures trading, where payment of commissions is deferred and
then made in lump sum, the Board was forced to presume that half of the
total commissions were paid on sales.
The Board's use of securities precedents was nevertheless of doubtful
propriety. Although the Supreme Court in the Winnill case did not cover
commissions on sales, its silence can be attributed to the absence 6f the issue
on certiorari. Moreover, the rationale for its decision-tacit approval of
administrative rulings by Congressional reenactment "'-seems equally appli-
cable to require deduction of sales commissions from sale price.52 In addi-
tion, there is no apparent policy basis for making a distinction between the
two types of commissions. Even if the distinction is valid for securities in-
vestment, it should not be applied to futures in which lump-sum commissions
are institutional. This is emphasized by the Board's resort to a presumption in
of own capital stock); Briarcliff Investment Co., 30 B. T. A. 1269 (1934) (real estate
commissions) ; Odorono Co., 26 B. T. A. 1355 (1932) (attorney's fees in connection with
sale of assets).
47. See Odorono Co., 26 B. T. A. 1355, 1358 (1932).
48. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79 (1938).
49. The Second Circuit had held both purchase and sale commissions of a trader in
securities deductible as business expenses. Winmill v. Commissioner, 93 F. (2d) 494
(C. C. A. 2d, 1937). Although the Supreme Court, in Helvering v. Wipnill, reversed
that decision as to the purchase commissions, the Circuit Court, in a per euriain opinion,
announced that its rule as to sale commissions would still be applied. Neuberger v. Coln-
missioner, 104 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), reoVd on another issue, 311 U. S. 83
(1940).
50. George W. Covington, 42 B. T. A. 601 (1940).
51. See Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenuc Acts (1941) 54 I-Lv.
L. REv. 377; Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem (1941) 54 I-HARv. L.
REv. 398.
52. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.24-2. The clause "when such commissions are
not an ordinary and necessary business expense" was inserted to permit a dealer in se-
curities to deduct selling commissions because of practical accounting difficulties peculiar
to a dealer. G. C. M. 15430, XIV-2 CUM. BULL. 59 (1935). The Board of Tax Appeals,
however, has followed the Neuberger decision allowing a non-dealer to make similar
deduction. Alice D. Ortiz, 42 B. T. A. 173 (1940). A recent decision has reversed the
Board's position and subjected sales commissions to the Winzill principle. Spreckels v.




calculating the commissions on sales. From the point of view of admini'-
tration, therefore, the court's decision is additionally justified.
If the adopted principles are upheld, definition of the taxation of commo-
dity futures is assured. But the problem of identification remains. While the
stigma of wagering will be rarely applied, the distinction between hedging and
legitimate investment will survive as a recurrent issue. In the Farmers &
Ginzers case, for example, the Board of Tax Appeals held the dealings to be
substantially hedges.53 Since, however, the transactions deviated from the
pattern of the true hedge in that refined futures were purchased after disposal
of the crude commodity, the Circuit Court considered them capital invest-
ments.5 But the deviation was necessitated by the lack of a futures market
for the crude and the need for disposing of the perishable commodity at un-
satisfactory prices. Under the circumstances the delayed future transaction
was presumably the only method of price insurance available.5 Related thus
to the taxpayer's trade, losses from the dealings, although not strictly hedg-
ing losses, might still have been treated as business expenses. When such
deviational futures transactions reappear in the future, more reliable identifi-
cation for tax purposes can be achieved by applying the principles which
initially determined the taxability of the institutional forms of dealing.
AVAILABILITY OF A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
WHEN ANOTHER SUIT IS PENDING*
ATTEMPTS to delineate the ambit of judicial discretion under the Federal
Declaratory Judgments Act' have been frequently impeded by the basic mis-
conception that it is mandatory for a court to assume jurisdiction of a
declaratory judgment suit whenever the jurisdictional facts are present.
Responsibility for that error may be attributed in part to the silence of the
federal law regarding discretion in contrast with a specific provision for it
in the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act adopted by the majority of
states.2 To a large extent, however, the erroneous conclusion stems from
53. Farmers & Ginners Cotton Oil Co., 41 B. T. A. 1023 (1940). This opinion
superseded an earlier holding that the transactions were not hedges. Farmers & Gin-
ners Cotton Oil Co., 41 B. T. A. 255 (1940).
54. Commissioner v. Farmers & Ginners Cotton Oil Co., 120 F. (2d) 772, 775 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1941), cert. denied, 62 Sup. Ct. 185 (U. S. 1941). The court held that the
purchase of refined gave no price insurance.
55. See Farmers & Ginners Cotton Oil Co., 41 B. T. A. 1033, 1035 (1940).
*Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Garrow Co., 39 F. Supp. 100 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
1. 48 STAT. 995, 28 U. S. C. § 400 (1934).
2. Section 6 of the Uniform Act provides: "The court may refuse to render or
enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered
or entered would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the pro-
ceedings." Thus far twenty-seven states have adopted the Uniform Act See Boncnmmi,
DECLAP,ATORY JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1941) 133. 'Maine and Vest Virginia are the latest
recruits. ME. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1941) c.233; AV. VA. CODE Aim. (Michie & Sublett,
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a failure to distingush between the preliminary question of the possession
of jurisdiction by a court and the secondary issue of the proper exercise
of that jurisdiction when it concededly exists.3 Conscious of that cleavage
now, courts generally recognize that the assumption of jurisdiction as well
as the granting or withholding of a declaratory judgment is discretionary.
4
When a declaratory judgment is sought while another suit is pending in
a different court, the propriety of mandatory jurisdiction seems particularly
doubtful. In such cases, therefore, most federal courts regard the issuance
of a declaratory judgment as a matter within their discretion.5 When con-
fronted with that issue, however, the reaction of a federal district court in
New York was deviational.6 After suit was begun in a state court upon
a conventional liability policy, the insurer, alleging failure to furnish an
immediate written notice of the accident as required by the insurance con-
tract, sought a declaratory judgment in federal court that the policy was
null and void in respect to that particular claim. The court ruled that the
Supp. 1941) § 5516. For the sake of brevity the drafters of the Federal Act made no
specific reference to discretion. There was no intent, however, to abandon the rule of
discretion established in foreign courts. Id. at 293, 313. To banish any lingering doubts,
the Committee Note to Federal Rule 57 states that the Uniform Act, which allows
discretion, is to be a guide to procedure under the Federal Act. NOTES TO FED. RULES
Crv. PRoC. 57. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A.
4th, 1937); American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F. (2d) 613 (C. C. A. 7th,
1939).
3. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. United Corp. of Mass., 29 F. Supp. 986 (D.
Mass. 1939), rev'd, 111 F. (2d) 443 (C. C.A. 1st, 1940) (declaratory judgment not
granted due to lack of jurisdiction); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 108 F. (2d) 824
(C. C. A. 8th, 1940) (dismissed below "for want of jurisdiction") ; cf. Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Rhame, 32 F. Supp. 59 (E. D. S. C. 1940) (no discretion to refuse
jurisdiction of appropriate case).
Insurance lawyers, in particular, frequently confuse the existence of jurisdiction
with the exercise of jurisdiction when they insist that a declaratory judgment must be
granted by a court whenever the jurisdictional facts are presented. Whether their
attitude is due to conceptual difficulties or a desire to expand the use of the declaratory
action is not clear. See Morrison, Availability of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act
for Life Insurance Cases (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 788, 791; Morrison, Federal Declaratory
Actions and Cas(alty Insurance (1941) 9 U. OF KAN. CiTY L. REV. 211, 213; Shackle-
ford, The Importance of the Federal Declaratory Procedure to Insurance Carriers (1939)
6 INs. COUNSEL J. 38; Aitken, Use of Federal Declaratory Judgment Act In Contro-
versies Involving Insurance Contracts (1938) 17 Nzn. L. BULL. 107, 112; Appleman,
Federal Declaratory Judgments On Automobile Insurance [1939] Wis. L. Rav. 496, 499.
4. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. (2d) 321, 324 (C. C. A. 4th,
1937); American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F. (2d) 613, 619 (C. C. A. 7th,
1939) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Koch, 102 F. (2d) 288, 294 (C. C. A.
3d, 1939); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Consumers Finance Service, 101 F. (2d) 514, 515
(C. C. A. 3d, 1938). Cases involving discretion are collected in ANDERSON, DECLARATORY
JUDGmENTS (1940) 515 et seq. The grounds for refusing jurisdiction or judgment are
subject to appeal. See BoacHApi, op. cit. supra note 2, at 293, 299, 313.
5. See cases cited infra note 11 and, generally, Comment (1941) 9 GEo. WASh. L.
REV. 440.
6. Associated Indemnity Corp. v. G'arrow Co., 39 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
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matter had been settled by the case of Maryland Casualty Company v. Pacific
Coal and Oil Company.7 There, according to the District judge, the Supreme
Court held declaratory relief available as a matter of law rather than judicial
discretion in an analogous situation. No further precedents were cited; no
other pertinent arguments were advanced.
Careful scrutiny of the Maryland Casually Company opinion, however,
reveals no intent to make mandatory the issuance of a declaratory judgment
by a federal court when another suit is pending. In that case a state action
had been initiated against the insured, but the insurer had not been joined
as a defendant. When the insurer applied for a declaration of rights in the
federal court, it joined the injured party as defendant. The vital issue was
whether the company had an interest as against the injured party. Neither
expressly nor by inference did the Court decide more than that an actual
controversy between insurer and party injured was presented which would
justify a declaratory remedy. Significant also is the fact that in a subse-
quent circuit court decision s it has been held, without allusion to the Maryland
Casualty Comnpany case, that full discretion existed when another action was
pending in a state court.
That the reaction of the court in the principal case was deviational is
emphasized by a review of judicial precedents. The discretionary theory
emerges repeatedly in general dicta, even where the narrow question of its
propriety during the pendency of another suit is not squarely put.0 The
rule appears directly, however, where an earlier action involving similar
questions and parties is pending in a state tribunal.10 If sheer weight of
authority be determinative, virtually all pertinent decisions in the various
7. 312 U. S. 270 (1941), rcv'g 111 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940).
S. Excess Ins. Co. of America v. Brillhart, 121 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941).
9. Most frequently cited as authority for permitting full discretion when another
suit is pending is Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A.
4th, 1937). Its force as a binding precedent on that precise question may, however,
be diminished somewhat by the fact that another judgment had already been recovered
settling all vital issues. Only a routine action to enforce that judgment against the
insurer was "pending" when declaratory relief was sought.
Elsewhere, because of additional complicating facts, dicta have supplanted clear cut
holdings on the existence of discretion when another suit is pending. See Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Consumers Finance Service, 101 F. (2d) 514 (C.C. A. 3d, 193S) (state
suit did not embrace all issues); American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F.
(2d) 613 (C. C.A. 7th, 1939) (garnishment proceedings already begun in state court).
10. See Excess Ins. Co. of America v. Brillhart, 121 F. (2d) 776, 778 (C. C. A.
10th, 1941): "Ordinarily a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and over
the parties to a justiciable controversy must exercise that jurisdiction. This is, however,
not an absolute mandate and the court has some discretionary power as to whether it
%ill in each instance assume and exercise the jurisdiction which the statute confers.
. . . Where a prior action has been filed in a court of concurrent jurisdiction between
the same parties and involving the same issues and a decision by that court would
adjudicate all the rights of the parties, a federal court, although having jurisdiction
to entertain an action brought by a defendant in the pending cause, may within its
discretionary powers refuse to entertain jurisdiction . . ."
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circuits subscribe to the discretionary theory under those conditions. 1 Unless
the principal case prevails, the mandatory concept now seems to retain vitality
only in the Fifth Circuit. Adherence there dates from a dictum that when
a petition for a declaratory judgment presents an actual controversy of
which the court has jurisdiction, it is bound to give the remedy regardless
of a pending suit embracing identical issues.1 2 Yet a district court in that
circuit has since, in effect, repudiated that opinion.1
3
Occasional flurries in other dicta and sallies by insurance lawyers in the
legal literature indicate, however, that proponents of the mandatory theory
have a pattern of objections to the discretionary rule. Silence in the federal
act regarding discretion is alleged to imply an intent to reject extensive
precedents for complete discretion rather than a purpose to follow that
established practice. 14 More specifically, discretion to refuse a declaratory
judgment when another suit is pending is said to be a violation of the Federal
Rules which forbid denial of a declaratory judgment merely because of
the availability of another remedy.15 Invariably it is argued that a court
cannot refuse relief once its jurisdiction is invoked."; Abatement of a federal
action solely on the basis that a similar suit has been filed in the state court
is thought to run counter to settled jurisdictional practice which permits
such simultaneous actions.1
7
Even in non-declaratory judgment cases, however, the federal courts often
recognize their discretionary power to decline to exercise the jurisdiction
11. Western Supplies Co. v. Freeman, 109 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brannen, 31 F. Supp. 123 (S. D. Ia. 1940) ; Ohio Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Murphy, 28 F. Supp. 252 (W. D. Ky. 1939). For representative dicta upholding
discretion of courts to decline jurisdiction or refuse declaratory relief, see Excess Ins.
Co. of America v. Brillhart, 121 F. (2d) 776, 778 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941); Maryland
Casualty Co. v. United Corp. of Mass., 111 F. (2d) 443, 446 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940);
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Koch, 102 F. (2d) 288, 294 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939);
American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F. (2d) 613, 618, 619 (C. C. A. 7th,
1939); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 99 F. (2d) 665, 669 (C. C. A. 4th,
1938); General Accident Fire & Life Ass. Corp. v. Morgan, 30 F. Supp. 753, 754
(W. D. N. Y. 1939); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Busch, 22 F. Supp. 72 (S. D.
Cal. 1938). See also 3 MooRE, FFDERAL PRAcrICE (1938) 3229.
12. Carpenter v. Edmonson, 92 F. (2d) 895, 897 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937): "Even if
the two suits involved identical matters . . .we think it plain that under the Federal
Declaratory judgments Act the petition stated a cause of actual controversy as to
which the court's jurisdiction was invoked and of which it was bound to take cog-
nizance." For criticism of this case, see BORCHARDW op. cit. supra note 2, at 659.
13. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wechsler, 34 F. Supp. 717 (S. D. Fla. 1940). Although
there was no express reference to discretion, the court appeared to exercise its discretion
in dismissing a declaratory judgment action because of pending suits.
14. See Morrison, supra note 3, 23 A. B. A. J., at 793.
15. Fw. RuLEs Civ. PRoc., 57. See Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ryan,
109 F. (2d) 690, 691 (C. C.A. 6th, 1940).
16. See Morrison, supra note 3, 23 A. B. A. J., at 791, 792; Shackleford, supra note
3, at 39, 40.
17. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922); Armour & Co. v.
Miller, 91 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) ; see 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 11, at 227.
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conferred by statute.I s Furthermore, one of the chief attributes of declaratory
judgment procedure is the opportunity it provides for reducing jurisdic-
tional friction." Therefore, even if federal courts in most cases must act
once their jurisdiction is properly invoked, the same rule is nut ipso facto
to be applied where declaratory relief is sought. - 0 The allegation of a vio-
lation of the Federal Rules is likewise unsound. When another suit is
pending, the reason for dismissing a declaratory action is its failure to serve
a useful purpose, not the availability of another remedy. 2' If, finally, any
inference is to be drawn from the silence of the federal statute on the matter
of discretion, testimony of its drafters and judicial interpretations indicate
that agreement with, rather than rejection of, the established discretionary
rule is implied.
22
Besides substantial judicial precedent, additional reasons of pl-slicy sho uld
impel the courts to adopt the rule of discretion. It is almost certain to
promote economy of litigation. Because of already overcrowded dockets and
the expense entailed, there is no justification for conducting simultaneous
actions involving similar interests and parties in federal and state courts
when one tribunal can settle all issues satisfactorily. Moreover, procedural
fencing may be eliminated2 if courts are allowed to decide in each case
whether circumstances justify the remedy. Out-of-state insurance companies
may be blocked from using the declaratory action as a substitute for the
removal privilege in the expectation of obtaining a more favorable hearing
in federal court.2 4 Harassing of impecunious litigants by forcing them to
participate in dual suits would be minimized. Parties may also be prevented
from engaging in a race for res judicata after invoiking the jurisdiction of
both state and federal courts.2  Furthermore, despite its flexibility, the dis-
cretionary theory may be adopted with assurance that the rights of the parties
will be fully protected. Opportunity for appeal offers adequate redress fur
any abuse of discretion. 6 Now that early antipathies have vanished and the
nature of the remedy is more thoroughly understood, perhaps the federal
18. See Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1, 19 (1939); Rogers v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123, 130, 131 (1933); Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Co., 285
U. S. 413, 422 (1932).
19. See p. 518 infra.
20. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. (2d) 321, 324 (C. C. A.
4th, 1937); American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F. (2d) 613, 617 (C. C. A.
7th, 1939); Excess Ins. Co. of America v. Brillhart, 121 F. (2d) 776, 777 (C. C. A.
10th, 1941).
21. The availability of another remedy signifies that there is another, but unused,
remedy in that particular action. See Stephenson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soiety,
92 F. (2d) 406, 408, 409 (C. C.A. 4th, 1937).
22. See note 2 supra.
23. See Continental Casualty Co. v. National Household Distributors, 32 F. Supp.
849, 851 (E. D. Wis. 1940).
24. See American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F. (2d) 613, 617 (C. C. A.
7th, 1939).
25. For examples of the use of declaratory judgment actions to encourage such a
practice,/see Carpenter v. Edmonson, 92 F. (2d) 895 (C. C.A. 5th, 1937); Central
Surety & Ins. Corp. v. Norris, 103 F. (2d) 116 (C. C.A. 5th, 1939).
26. BoaAcamm, op. cit. supra note 2, at 293, 299, 313.
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courts will err, if at all, on the side of liberality in allowing declaratory relief.
At least it may be expected that each application will be considered on its
merits rather than in blind adherence to a mandate which would force the
court to grant the remedy whenever its jurisdiction is invoked, irrespective
of whether a useful purpose would be served.
Even where the discretionary theory prevails, the proper mode of em-
ploying that discretion presents new problems. General criteria, however,
have already emerged to form a basis for solution of the problems. The
declaratory judgment should not be used to settle controversies piecemeal.," T
An effort should be made to weigh the relative ability of the alternative
courts to furnish a comprehensive settlement of all vital issues.28  Thus,
when an action relating to identical subject matter and parties is being con-
sidered by another court, a federal court generally ought to deny an appli-
cation for declaratory relief. 20  It is evident that no actual judgment need
have been recovered in the state suit to justify withholding a declaration.
Moreover, it has been intimated that mere convenience to litigants might
be controlling in a choice of courts.3 0 Since concurrent suits where the issues
and parties are precisely the same do not appear frequently, 31 it would
be unwise to adopt an immutable rule that the whole controversy must be
capable of settlement in the pending action to warrant a refusal of declar-
atory relief. On the other hand, even though the issues in the federal and
state suits are interdependent, declaratory relief should not necessarily be
refused. Where, for example, an insurance company's federal suit seeking
exoneration under a policy is concurrent with the injured party's state action
for negligence, with or without the company as a potential defendant, the
federal issue may be decided since it is autonomous and crucial to the whole
litigation.
32
Aside from the broader problems of an application of the court's discre-
tion, difficulties arise when it is necessary to determine whether an "identity
27. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
28. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Consumers Finance Service, 101 F. (2d) 514
(C.C.A. 3d, 1938).
29. Excess Ins. Co. of America v. Brillhart, 121 F. (2d) 776 (C. C.A. 10th,
1941); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
Frequently it may be very convenient to determine the insurer's liability in the state
suit when the insurer volunteers to defend or could easily be joined in the state litigation.
Complications may arise, however, in those states which have a procedural taboo against
admitting insurance companies as parties to a negligence action. See Coucu, CvCLOPEDIA
OF INsURANcE LAw (1931) § 2254. Usually in such situations a declaratory judgment
should be granted where it would be advantageous both for the insurer and for a
plaintiff of limited means reluctant to proceed if he has only the prospect of an un-
certain judgment against an insured with doubtful ability to pay. On the use of
declaratory judgments in insurance cases, see Borchard, Declaratory Judgments and
Insurance Litigation, (1939) 34 ILL. L. R-v. 245; Comment (1938) 26 GEo. L. J. 988,
30. See Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Richards, 27 F. Supp. 18, 20 (D. Ore. 1939).
31. In some insurance actions where the issues of fact in the state negligence suit
may be poles apart from those in the federal action to declare the policy void or inap-
plicable, the declaratory judgment may be properly granted.
32. See BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 298. In such cases, it may be argued
that the issues are not identical.
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of issues" exists in a particular case.m Since the federal court has had no
opportunity to analyze the conflicting interests, identity may be especially
hard to detect when the state suit has not progressed far and the question
comes up originally on a motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment34 When
the issues are similar but the parties different, there is authority for the
view that the state court should be allowed to proceed and retain sole juris-
diction if such deference would be an important contribution to economy of
litigation.35 The soundest practice is to grant a declaratory judgment if
there is any reasonable doubt as to similarity of interests, so long as other
jurisdictional prerequisites are satisfied.
The term "pendency" also becomes elusive when its meaning is relevant
to the issue of granting or withholding a declaratory judgment. Both time
of filing and the condition of the dockets are important in determining the
status of the state proceedings. If the state suit has only been filed recently
and the docket is congested or litigation is moving slowly, relief by the
federal court may be desirable though the earlier suit would eventually settle
all issues. Should it happen that the federal docket in a particular district
is more crowded than that of the state court, the Federal Rules permit a
declaratory judgment action to be advanced upon the calendar."" But if the
state suit is nearing a judgment that would comprehend all essential ques-
tions, there would be little need of the declaratory remedy. Nice distinctions
must be made, however, when a suit is only imminent or threatened. If the
filing of a state action is imminent and would provide a much more compre-
hensive settlement than a declaratory judgment on a narrow issue, there
might seem to be justification for the federal court to decline jurisdiction.
But courts are reluctant to depart from the usual practice of granting declar-
atory relief when there is only a supposition that another suit may be
instituted.
37
Finally, discretion should be employed wherever possible as a lubricant
to avoid jurisdictional friction. Usually a federal court will refuse to enter-
tain any action when a similar suit is pending in another federal court.03
33. Although most courts agree that a declaratory judgment should be denied where
another pending suit involves identical parties and issues, there is a dearth of criteria
for detecting "identity."
34. See Shackleford, supra note 3, at 43.
35. See BORcHARD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 351 (only state precedents are cited).
36. FED. Rurms Civ. PRoc. 57.
37. "There is no discretion in the district court to refuse to proceed in a declaratory
judgment because in some other action in the future the other party might be entitled
to relief which would dispose of the issues involved in the declaratory judgment action."
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 108 F. (2d) 824, 828 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) citing Columbian
National Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, S9 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) ; Vrestern Casualty
and Surety Co. v. Beverforden, 93 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. Sth, 1937); vw York Life
Ins. Co. v. Roe, 102 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
38. See Bush v. Texas & P. Ry., 290 Fed. 100, 1011 (AV. D. La. 1922); Ryan
v. Seaboard & R. R., 89 Fed. 397, 407 (E. D. Va. 1S98); 1 Moona, op. cit. Mspra
note 11, at 237.
Applications for declaratory judgments in patent litigation are often denied became
a previous suit is being heard by another federal court. Western Supplies Co. v.
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State tribunals likewise ordinarily decline to interfere with prior acquired
state jurisdiction.8 9 Yet a general sanction permits state and federal courts
to conduct simultaneous suits in personam involving similar issues and
parties.40 Though tempted to take advantage of this sanction when a declara-
tory judgment is sought, federal courts should use discretion to avoid not
only duplication of litigation, but conflicts incident to the rule of res judicata.
Moreover, injunctions have frequently been sought in federal court to stay
state proceedings until disposal of a declaratory action. Despite an express
prohibition against enjoining state suits,41 federal courts were formerly liberal
in granting these injunctions.4 2 Recently, however, the courts appear to
respect the prohibition and thus tacitly encourage a race for priority of
judgment.4 3 Discretion, properly exercised, would remove the necessity for
injunctions and eliminate attendant jurisdictional clashes and wasteful liti-
gation.
If the recent revival of the mandatory theory is rejected, the rule of full
discretion will be more firmly established. In future litigation the initial
distinction between the assumption and exercise of jurisdiction should le
more consistently observed. When another suit is pending, the courts should
be particularly discriminating in the exercise of discretion. If the advantages
of declaratory judgment procedure are recognized, discretion can be adapted
to insure that any declaratory judgments granted will serve that useful pur-
pose envisaged by the Act.
Freeman, 109 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940); Staley Elevator Co., Inc. v. Otis
Elevator Co., 35 F. Supp. 778 (D. N. J. 1940); Link-Belt Co. v. Dorr Co., 15 F.
Supp. 663 (D. Del. 1936).
39. See American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F. (2d) 613, 616 (C. C. A.
7th, 1939).
40. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922); Armour & Co. v.
Miller, 91 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) ; see 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 11, at 227.
41. 36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §379 (1934).
42. See, generally, BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 661 c seq.
43. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270 (1941);
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 99 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) ; Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Consumers Finance Service, 101 F. (2d) 514 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938);
Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v. Norris, 103 F. (2d) 116 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); Ballard
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 109 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940). For the most recent ex-
pression of general reluctance to permit federal courts to enjoin state proceedings, see
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co,, 62 Sup. Ct. 139 (U. S. 1941).
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